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because experts testify about dispositive issues such as the competitive
effect of a business practice or the relevant boundaries of a market. And the
Supreme Court has encouraged—even engineered—this delegation to
economic authority. But when antitrust judges are faced with the
appearance of deadlock among economic experts, they are forced to either
decide the substance of the economics themselves or ask the jury to resolve
it as a matter of fact. Both practices void much of the benefit of courtroom
expertise. This Article examines several reforms that would make expert
testimony less adversarial and evaluates their ability to better reveal the true
distribution of expert opinion on an economic question. It then presents two
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would increase the likelihood that consensus economic views prevail at
trial.
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INTRODUCTION
The adversarial presentation of evidence tends to mask factual
agreement between parties to a lawsuit. American trial procedure reduces
points of agreement to a list of stipulations recited blandly at the close of
the real evidence—the evidence presented in the theater of trial with live
examination of witnesses and displays of physical evidence. Emphasizing
disagreement can lead to better factfinding when it encourages investigation
beyond the obvious or intuitive answer, which is often wrong in a typical
“he said, she said” legal dispute. But when it comes to expert testimony, the
value of adversity comes with a significant cost. A fact witness is meant to
represent a single, often self-interested perspective, but a courtroom expert
is meant to represent a larger body of knowledge; he is most convincing
when he can claim to be a part speaking for the whole.1 And if the majority
of his colleagues agree about a proposition, a factfinder should want to
know both the proposition and its status as the consensus view.
The adversarial presentation of expert evidence can exaggerate the
importance of a minority view on a scientific question.2 As long as there is
some scientifically legitimate difference of opinion, one side can exploit
1

See E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 499 (1989) (“[T]he philosophy of expert testimony is that
science itself is testifying through a particular expositor of a discipline.”).
2
See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1130; Sheila Jasanoff, What
Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 345, 354 (1992).
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that difference by calling an expert from the minority side. If, out of one
hundred experts, ninety-nine agree on a proposition, one side may call the
outlier, and the other may call one of the heartland experts. This will make a
real-world ratio of 99:1 appear, in the courtroom, closer to 1:1.3 So the legal
system can create an illusion of insoluble disagreement even if all experts
are presumed to be honest, qualified, and unbiased. All scientific
communities have good-faith holdouts and mavericks. Even if the split of
scientific opinion on a question is not so dramatic as the divide between
mavericks and mainstreamers, a judge should care about the actual
distribution of opinion and which side it favors. This feature of adversarial
expertise causes problems in any suit with expert witnesses. And the more
an area of law demands technical reasoning, the more acute the problem is
likely to be. So in antitrust, where the Supreme Court delegates both
factfinding and rulemaking to courtroom economists,4 the problem is
especially costly—and getting more so as the Court continues to expand the
role of experts. Thus, antitrust litigation provides both a clear illustration of
obscured expert consensus and the perfect laboratory in which to test bold
or new solutions to it.
Increasingly, the Court has abandoned clumsy per se rules for
determining antitrust liability, replacing them with all-things-considered
inquiries that have made courtroom economics not just inevitable but often
dispositive.5 In one sense, this is just another incarnation of the old rulesversus-standards debate, another pendulum swing from off-the-rack to
tailor-made legal norms. But in another sense, the rise of standards in
antitrust analysis represents a delegation of authority from law and judges
to economics and economists who can more finely tune legal norms to
market realities. Closely analyzing the competitive context and effects of a
business practice is a task that a lay judge or jury cannot perform unaided.
For these kinds of inquiries, the Supreme Court asks antitrust judges to
defer to courtroom experts. And when there is disagreement among experts,
the Supreme Court has viewed the consensus position as authoritative.6

3

Gross, supra note 2, at 1185; see also David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and
the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2008) (explaining that
expert “selection bias” gives the jury “a false sense that the issue is a very close one, when expert
opinion actually overwhelmingly favors one side”); Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 189 (2010) (“Rather than seeing a sample of expert opinions that cluster around
the truth, as in the real world, in litigation the factfinder sees only two opposite extremes of expert
opinion.”).
4
See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Antitrust Economics—Making Progress, Avoiding Regression, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2003).
5
See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1375, 1379 (2009).
6
See Thomas G. Hungar & Ryan G. Koopmans, Appellate Advocacy in Antitrust Cases: Lessons
from the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 53, 54 (“[T]he court in recent years has frequently
looked to the majority views of economists to help resolve antitrust issues . . . .”); see, e.g., Leegin
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But since virtually every economic proposition is characterized as
creating meaningful expert disagreement, antitrust judges cannot merely
defer to the discipline of economics as a neutral source for unambiguous
factual inputs to a rule or decision.7 Adversarial expertise ensures that a
judge cannot easily defer to a consensus view. Judges’ interventionist
treatment of economic testimony in antitrust cases, a phenomenon well
documented in antitrust scholarship,8 can be attributed, in part, to the
problem of distorted expert opinion. Judges are understandably anxious
about treating divergent expert economic testimony as authoritative or
deserving of deference, so judges must find ways to use Daubert hearings
and summary judgment to engage in their own first-order analysis of
economic questions. The only available alternative, punting the issue to a
jury, is probably no better.9 Both options void much of the benefit of
courtroom expertise, undermining the Supreme Court’s vision for antitrust
as an area of law driven by sophisticated economic science.
Since antitrust provides a good illustration of the obscured-consensus
problem, it may provide a great place to test solutions to it. Most proposed
solutions to the general problem of dueling expert opinions focus on
reforming courtroom expertise to be less adversarial. These solutions are
worth examining for their potential to solve the challenges of obscured
consensus in the antitrust context. But this Article also moves beyond the
existing proposals by suggesting two mechanisms that would keep expert
evidence adversarial and also give antitrust judges a more accurate picture
of the distribution of economic opinion. First, judges in antitrust cases
might simply require testimony on the consensus status of an expert
opinion, either to address its admissibility or its weight. Second, one may
borrow a controversial procedure from jury selection and allow each side of
an antitrust suit to preemptively strike a small number of experts from their
opponents’ witness list, eliminating outliers and leaving only mainstream
experts to testify.
Part I explains how the adversarial presentation of expertise masks
consensus where it exists. Part II explains the role of economics and
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 15–18 (1997).
7
Cf. Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical
Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 961 (2004) (“[T]he mere fact that experts often
seemed to disagree with one another was seen by some to diminish the authority of the medical
community as a whole. . . . Even if disagreement did not betoken lack of knowledge, it was seen to
diminish the credence lay people gave to medical testimony.”).
8
See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the
Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 663 (1997);
Lipsky, supra note 4; John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of
Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (2005).
9
On the other hand, a jury might be no worse off in evaluating an economic expert’s claim because
a jury at least has the advantage of many minds. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 196.
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economists in antitrust to show why obscured consensus is an especially
large and growing problem there. Part III identifies the mistakes and
incoherencies in antitrust litigation that can be attributed to the distortive
effect that the adversarial process has on economic expertise. Part IV
evaluates various procedural reforms for their ability to increase the
likelihood that expert consensus, where it exists, gets its day in court.
I.

THE ADVERSARIAL PRESENTATION OF EXPERTS MASKS CONSENSUS
The use of the adversarial system to establish scientific principles has
been widely criticized.10 To say that the courtroom is no laboratory is an
understatement, and the illustrations of this principle are many. Science is
cumulative and is never finished, while a trial must come to an end.
Scientists use expertise to draw conclusions from observations; judges and
juries use deduction and intuition. Scientific discovery is the grand pursuit
of truth while a lawsuit is at best the pursuit of justice and at worst an
ignoble money-grab. But most indictments of legal science start with the
premise that expert witnesses are biased or untruthful.11 These traditional
criticisms decry the financial incentives that lead witnesses to shade their
testimony,12 the aura of impartiality that insulates an expert from
skepticism,13 and the tendency of the system to select opportunistic quacks
over mainstream practitioners.14 Biased scientific experts, so the argument

10

See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 1, at 477–78 (“Many commentators believe that case-by-case
litigation before lay judges and juries is not the best way to resolve scientific and technical
controversies . . . .”); Peter Huber, A Comment on Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three
Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence by E. Donald Elliott, 69 B.U. L. REV. 513, 513 (1989)
(“[T]he scientific method and the adversary system are polar opposites.”); Jasanoff, supra note 2, at 353
(“The adversary process is much less effective . . . in reconstructing the communally held beliefs that
reasonably pass for truth in science.”).
11
See, e.g., In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1499–1500, 1500 n.5
(D. Kan. 1995) (contrasting the credibility of two competing experts, noting that it was “no surprise”
that the “professional stature” of an economics professor was “unequal to that of” an expert who
“devoted his career to partisan adjudicatory purposes”); Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the ShootOut with the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full Expert Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465,
468–70 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 758
(1992); Robertson, supra note 3, at 185–88.
12
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 2, at 1129–32; Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 53 (1901); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1011–12 (2008);
Robertson, supra note 3, at 187–88.
13
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 2, at 1179 (“Judges sometimes complain that jurors attribute a
‘mystic infallibility’ to expert evidence.” (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C.
Cir. 1974))); cf. Lisa C. Wood, Court-Appointed Independent Experts: A Litigator’s Critique,
ANTITRUST, Spring 2007, at 91, 94 (“[C]ourt-appointed experts may acquire an aura of infallibility to
which they are not entitled . . . .”).
14
See, e.g., Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 747 (1992).
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goes, result in improper jury awards and, even more troublingly, excessive
settlements induced by the specter of expert testimony.15
While bias or outright fraud may impair truthfinding in antitrust trials,
the problem of dueling experts is more fundamental than what conventional
wisdom allows. Heterogeneity among expert witnesses, whatever its cause,
threatens to obscure a consensus position. At least some disagreement
among scientific experts, even without bad faith, is virtually guaranteed
because even carefully proven propositions draw dissenters within an
academic community. One good way to choose from a heterogeneous set of
expert opinions would be to find out if there is a consensus view and to
capture its benefits of accuracy and predictability.16 To do this, the law
needs a factfinding mechanism that is good at revealing consensus. The
adversarial system is good at just the opposite.
A. Sources of Heterogeneity Among Expert Opinions
When experts disagree in court about a technical or scientific
proposition, the most obvious explanation is the “hired gun” thesis: experts
say what they are paid to say.17 This simple incentive-based notion probably
has a good deal of explanatory power, and the expert fee is not the only
incentive that can tempt an expert to be partial. An expert’s reputation
among litigators ensures future business.18 In part, this reputation will be
defined by his adherence to a party line—he may make his reputation as a
regulatory hawk or a dove, or a plaintiff-side or defense-side expert.19
Experts hoping to signal themselves as hawks or doves will want to base
their opinions on legal outcomes, not on science. But this can also backfire,
since an expert’s reputation for intellectual honesty can go far with a judge

15

See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 3, at 181–84. For an economic analysis of the costs of inaccurate
judgments, see Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
16
For a discussion of the informational benefits of nose-counting among experts, see Adrian
Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231 (2009).
17
For an early example of this fear, see Struve, supra note 7, at 963 (“[W]e are accustomed to hear
of a medical prosecution and a medical defence, as if the whole duty of a medical jurist consisted in
his making the best of a case, on the side for which he happens to be engaged . . . .” (quoting WILLIAM
A. GUY, PRINCIPLES OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 474 (New York, 1st Am. ed. Harper & Bros. 1845)).
18
See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 47 (1995) (attributing one scientist’s emergence as “a leading plaintiff’s witness in cases
involving claims of immunological damage from exposure to chemicals” to a $58 million jury verdict he
helped procure for railroad workers exposed to dioxin). Likewise, failure as a witness is bad for
business. See John L. Solow & Daniel Fletcher, Doing Good Economics in the Courtroom: Thoughts on
Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust, 31 J. CORP. L. 489, 490 (2006) (“Being on the losing side in
cases does not enhance one’s prospects for future consulting business . . . .”).
19
For example, in the medical malpractice context, doctors make their reputations as patient-side or
hospital-side advocates. See Gross, supra note 2, at 1132–33.
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evaluating his status as an expert.20 Additionally, the appearance of
impartiality will impress a jury. Peter Huber has gone so far as to
recommend that experts bolster their reputation for impartiality by
precommiting to publish their opinion “regardless of whose legal interests
[their] findings may favor.”21
How these contradictory incentives net out is an empirical question,
but it seems probable that the incentives to appear objective temper, but do
not eclipse, the truth shading that animates the hired gun thesis.22 This is
especially true if the influences on a scientist are not entirely conscious or
rational. Some bias probably comes from the very structure of a trial, as a
scientist feels like part of the “team.”23 An essay by expert economists
written as a guide for other economists contemplating serving as experts
observes, “[E]conomists are often regarded as members of the client’s team
rather than as outsiders. . . . Thus, in our experience, there have been few
boundaries to the nature of the contributions that are accepted, and even
expected, of the economists.”24
Although the hired gun thesis dominates the debate about dueling
experts, this focus obscures another troubling source of heterogeneity
among expert opinions: good-faith professional disagreement. Propositions
about all scientific disciplines, especially ones likely to be relevant in
litigation,25 inevitably draw at least one dissenter from within the academic
community.26 It is too much to expect that every expert observer of complex

20

Solow & Fletcher, supra note 18, at 490 (“The damage to one’s professional reputation that
accompanies such accusations [of manipulated or unfounded testimony] can be considerable.”).
21
Huber, supra note 14, at 752 (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing RICHARD P. FEYNMAN,
SURELY YOU’RE JOKING, MR. FEYNMAN! 341 (Edward Hutchings, ed., 1985) (“[T]he idea is to try to
give all of the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information
that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.”)).
22
See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls
and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 273–75 (2001). But see Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1537–38 (1999).
23
See Easton, supra note 11, at 497; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985); Robertson, supra note 3, at 185.
24
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Richard A. Pfau, Inducements to Advocacy: The Economist as
Independent Expert, in THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMIC ECONOMIST IN LITIGATION SUPPORT 207,
213–14 (Daniel J. Slottje ed., 1999); see also Robertson, supra note 3, at 185–88 (explaining the
affiliation bias of experts).
25
See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 459–63 (discussing why forensic science is especially prone to
internal controversy).
26
Hand, supra note 12, at 56 (“[T]here [is] some dispute upon almost all subjects of human
inquiry . . . .”); Lipsky, supra note 4, at 164 (observing that “[o]f course there will never be complete
unanimity” of economic opinion); Uri Shwed & Peter S. Bearman, The Temporal Structure of Scientific
Consensus Formation, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 817, 818 (2010) (“[S]ome level of contestation is always
present in science.”).
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phenomena like the market, the human body, or the environment will agree
on an explanation, however widely accepted that explanation is.27
This should not cause us to despair about the possibility of courtroom
experts making scientifically reliable claims. In all scientific disciplines,
truth is defined by areas of substantial consensus that a proposition is the
best available explanation for a set of observed phenomena.28 The degree of
agreement necessary to establish the truth of any scientific proposition is
something short of unanimity. Minor or marginal disagreement does not
negate the truth of a consensus position, even in the “hard” sciences. For the
law to properly incorporate scientific knowledge it must recreate those
points of consensus that pass for truth within the scientific community.
B. The 99:1 Problem
When faced with a heterogeneous pool of expert opinions, how can a
judge separate the truly controversial propositions from those that are
widely accepted? In other words, how can a judge learn about the
distribution of opinion on a matter? For example, imagine there are 100
people who are experts in resale economics. Say 99 experts agree that the
benefits of resale price maintenance (RPM) to interbrand competition
outweigh its potential to facilitate cartels, while 1 expert, with
unimpeachable qualifications and methodology, disagrees.29 One option
would be to require the parties to disclose the opinion of all 100 experts. A
less labor-intensive version of the same inquiry would be to take a random
sample from the 100 experts and extrapolate to the larger population of
experts. Either technique could reveal that there are few outliers, but the
first is often impossible, both because the exact number of experts is
typically unknown (not to mention the potential problems with sorting
experts from nonexperts at the margin) and because of cost.
The American system of expert evidence opts for a nonrandom version
of the sampling technique: some subset of all competent experts are called
as witnesses and asked for their opinion on the matter.30 Thinking of trial
witnesses as a sample of a larger population of potential witnesses may
seem unusual. Our romantic notion of a trial shuns aggregation and
extrapolation; the point of a trial is to do justice in a solitary, unique case.
This romantic ideal of the individualized trial probably accounts for judicial
27

This is perhaps especially true in a social science such as economics. As Jeffrey MacKie-Mason
and Richard Pfau explain, “all practicing economists—or for that matter, all social scientists—know
that the world of human commercial interactions is far too complex and imperfectly understood for
every well-intentioned, well-trained professional[] to agree on the interpretation of the same set of
facts.” MacKie-Mason & Pfau, supra note 24, at 207.
28
See Jasanoff, supra note 2, at 347.
29
See Gross, supra note 2, at 1185.
30
Several scholars have described the few expert witnesses who testify in a case as a “sample” of
the larger population of experts. See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 456; Robertson, supra note 3, at 189.
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disdain for pure statistical evidence31 and quantification of standards like
“reasonable doubt.”32 So, too, might we resist the idea of limiting fact
witnesses to a random set of one out of one hundred people who saw an
alleged tort, or saving on discovery costs by requiring disclosure of only
every third e-mail in a database.
This intuition reflects a rational judgment about retail factfinding:
outlying data can have crucial epistemological value.33 We expect a good
lawyer will interview all one hundred witnesses to find the one who
happened to see the color of the stoplight at the time of the accident. We sift
through all of a manager’s e-mails to find the one in which he uses racial
epithets to intimidate an employee. But the expert witness plays a different
factfinding role from the eyewitness or the smoking-gun e-mail. As an
expert, she represents a larger body of knowledge. The expert educates the
court about the state of the world not because the expert has unique
knowledge but quite the opposite. She has access to a body of knowledge
made up of a much larger set of thinkers, researchers, and practitioners.34
Whether the sampling technique can tell us about a consensus position
among heterogeneous expert opinion depends on the representativeness of
the sample: it must be random and it must be large enough to produce a
reliable result. The sample produced by adversarial presentation of expertise
fails both criteria. The number of experts who can speak to an issue is
severely limited by the rule against cumulative evidence, and the selection
technique is not at all random—the parties handpick experts they believe
best support their cause.35
31

See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 (1971) (introducing the famous “blue bus” hypothetical and critiquing
the use of naked statistical evidence in trials). Tribe’s article set off the “blue bus” debate that still rages
today. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Political—of
“Subsequent Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616, 1631–32, 1650 (2010); Max
Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 933, 956–57 (2009);
Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1130, 1163–64 (2010).
32
Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfreid, Case Comment—United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d
275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim that Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is
Unquantifiable?, 5 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 135–38 (2006) (canvassing judicial hostility to
quantification of “reasonable doubt”).
33
Cf. Gross, supra note 2, at 1129–30 (noting that the existence of an outlier eyewitness may lead a
party to concede a particular issue, while the existence of an outlier expert will lead a party to simply
find a new expert).
34
This may account for the ongoing use in state courts of the old Frye standard that emphasized
“general acceptance” in admitting expert testimony. For a discussion of the continued use of Frye, see
David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test,
41 JURIMETRICS J. 385 (2001).
35
See Robertson, supra note 3, at 184–85. Another version of the sampling problem occurs when
only some of the relevant analyses are presented in the courtroom. Harvard economist Hendrik S.
Houthakker recalls a case in which he debunked the opposition’s expert by pointing out that his
presentation of “price spreads” was incomplete. Hendrik S. Houthakker, Expert Testimony by
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Returning to the hypothetical breakdown of RPM experts, under the
adversarial system of expertise, a plaintiff in an RPM rule of reason case
will probably call the outlying economist who believes that RPM is, on
balance, anticompetitive. The defendant will call one of the other ninetynine. The defendant might want to call more to show that it is advocating
the majority view, but the judge should reject this request on the basis of the
testimony being cumulative and redundant, so irrelevant. The sample is
probably too small (only two) and certainly nonrandom (each side
handpicks to optimize its advantage). The result is an appearance of
deadlocked disagreement about the competitive potential for RPM among
qualified expert economists.36
In practice, consensus is not as easy to hide as this simple model would
suggest. The side advocating the minority view probably has higher search
costs since it must look harder for experts. This process begins with paying
one economist to prepare a report. If it comes out in favor of the majority
perspective, the party must start again with another expert until he happens
upon the outliers. But the extra cost imposed on a side advocating a
minority view ought not to be exaggerated. A good lawyer will know who
to ask for an outlying economic position; this process is probably not as
directionless as randomly picking an expert from a mixed pool.37 And a
minority expert can advertise himself, either formally or informally, to
reduce the cost of finding him. So it seems likely that the extra cost incurred
by the minority party will not fully reflect the marginality of the opinion he
seeks. Thus, the judge is more likely to hear from at least one marginal
expert than two mainstream ones and so is more likely to get an impression
of serious expert disagreement, even in substantially settled areas.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The 99:1 problem potentially arises in any trial where expert consensus
is relevant, but the more an area of law relies on expert and technical
arguments, the more hidden consensus can be expected to create costly
errors. Since the rise of microeconomics as the dominant tool for analyzing

Economists: What Makes It Effective?, in THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMIC ECONOMIST IN LITIGATION
SUPPORT, supra note 24, at 1, 7. The most relevant ones (and the ones that evidenced manipulation)
had been left out. Houthakker observes, “When I pointed out this omission on deposition and produced
an analysis of the spread in question, the defense case collapsed and a sizeable settlement was duly
agreed upon.” Id. Houthakker attributes this sampling problem to the “adversarial element” that
litigation adds to economics, an otherwise “peaceful” profession. Id.
36
This problem of manufactured disagreement can be found in journalism, where pressure to find
“balance” for every story can result in exaggeration of controversy. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 178
(noting “the mass media’s reflexive notion that there are two equally valid sides to every story”).
37
Robertson, supra note 3, at 184 (“Litigants use many devices to cherry-pick experts including
litigation history, word-of-mouth, and published papers.”).
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competition,38 antitrust has become one of the most expert-driven areas of
law. It therefore provides the perfect place to observe the perils of
adversarial expertise. In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has
delegated extensive authority to courtroom economists through its
propagation of rule of reason analysis39 and by emphasizing market
structure and firm performance over questions of conduct and intent.
Economic science is also invaluable in determining causation and the extent
of damages from anticompetitive conduct.40 This Part traces the ascent of
economic analysis in antitrust trials to its current place of prominence and
shows that in a great number of cases, determinations made by economists
are dispositive. It also explains how the Supreme Court—through case law
and the rules of evidence—has instructed trial judges to defer to economic
consensus in answering these questions.
A. The Role of Economics in Antitrust Law: The “Whole Game”
Although expertise is increasingly important in all areas of the law, the
rise of the economist in antitrust litigation has been especially dramatic.
This can be seen in two trends: (1) the recent movement towards using the
rule of reason to govern practices that used to be subject to per se liability
and (2) the increasing emphasis on structure and performance rather than
conduct. It is also evident in the fact that judges often have a hard time
drawing the fine line between factual expert testimony (admissible) and
expert testimony that goes to the law (inadmissible).41

38

See, e.g., Lipsky, supra note 4, at 165 (“[T]he rapid assimilation of microeconomics into antitrust
thinking makes almost every antitrust controversy an exercise in microeconomic analysis.”); Geoffrey
A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business
Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 614 & n.21 (2005)
(“Today economics is the primary tool for all aspects of antitrust analysis . . . .”); see also THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 1 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence
J. White, eds., 5th ed. 2009).
39
See infra Part II.A.1.a.
40
Andrew I. Gavil, Defining Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-Daubert/Kumho Tire Era:
Case Studies from Antitrust, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 867–74 (2000) (“Economists also have made
increasingly frequent appearances in antitrust cases as principal witnesses on damages.”). See generally
Michele Molyneaux, Comment, Quality Control of Economic Expert Testimony: The Fundamental
Methods of Proving Antitrust Damages, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1049 (2003) (providing a taxonomy of
acceptable econometric methods of proving antitrust damages).
41
To see how this debate plays out in the context of antitrust summary judgment, see Casper v.
SMG, 389 F. Supp. 2d 618 (D.N.J. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Atl. Exposition Servs. Inc. v. SMG, 262 F.
App’x 449 (3d Cir. 2008); Aventis Envtl. Sci. USA LP v. Scotts Co., 383 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 309, at 158 (3d ed. 2007).
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1.

The Sherman Act: From Standards to Rules and Back
Again.—Like the Constitution and unlike most modern statutes,
the Sherman Act is short and vague.42 And as in the constitutional context,
in interpreting the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has developed a set of
more rule-like rules to effectuate its broad aspirations. For example, the
Supreme Court announced in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co. that wholesalers selling a product to a retailer could not dictate a
minimum price the retailer can charge the customer for the product.43 The
first half-century of the Sherman Act saw courts pushing its vague
standards (no unreasonable restraints on trade) down the spectrum towards
rules (no resale price maintenance).
But now, as several scholars have observed, that trend has reversed.44
Per se rules made judges’ jobs easier because they could attach liability
after finding certain predicate facts (did the firm indeed enter an agreement
to set the retail price?) without a more complex inquiry into the
“reasonability” of the restriction. But these rules were too blunt to
efficiently regulate competition. For example, the per se rule against resale
price maintenance was both underinclusive and overinclusive. On the one
hand, it outlawed a procompetitive use of price maintenance: promotion of
interbrand competition.45 On the other hand, because it required explicit
agreement, it failed to prevent unilateral price maintenance even if the
practice had anticompetitive effects.46 This concern about per se antitrust
rules led to two shifts in antitrust doctrine: the rise of the rule of reason in
analyzing collusion claims and an increase in emphasis on structure and
performance over conduct in analyzing exclusion.
a. The rise of the rule of reason in collusion cases.—The rule of
reason is famously a misnomer;47 in fact, it is an all-things-considered
standard. The Supreme Court first articulated the standard in Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple
a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
42

For a summary of scholarship endorsing the Sherman-Act-as-constitution metaphor, and for a
full-throated critique of it, see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the
Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1986).
43
220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877 (2007).
44
See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 49, 55–71 (2007); Stucke, supra note 5, at 1407–17.
45
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–92.
46
Id. at 902.
47
Crane, supra note 44, at 57.
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such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.48

Although the rule of reason was born almost a century ago, it did not gain
traction until relatively recently. Beginning with Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. in 1977, the Court has steadily eroded per se liability in
favor of the rule of reason.49 In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., the Court applied the rule of reason to
the exclusion of members of a trade association, a practice previously
subject to per se liability.50 A few years later, in Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., the Court overruled the per se ban on
manufacturers discontinuing business with a retailer–customer after another
retailer–customer complained about it deviating from the MSRP.51 Perhaps
the most breathtaking reversal of a per se ban occurred recently in Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., where the Court overruled a
century-old precedent subjecting resale price maintenance to per se
liability.52 The shift from per se to rule of reason has been so complete that
it has prompted the Supreme Court to describe the rule of reason as the
default mode of analysis under the Sherman Act.53
In cases governed by the rule of reason, a party can argue that its
restriction is reasonable because of market circumstances and economic
effects. In contrast, in cases governed by a per se prohibition, a defendant
cannot avoid liability by justifying its restriction as efficient, fair, or
procompetitive. The stakes are high in deciding whether a practice should
be subject to the rule of reason or a per se ban because the choice of
standard is often dispositive. If a defendant’s conduct is uncontroversial,
either because it acted flagrantly or because it admits to the practice,
applying a per se rule means automatic liability. But less obviously,
applying the rule of reason typically means automatic nonliability.54

48

246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
433 U.S. 36, 49–59 (1977).
50
472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
51
485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988); see also Crane, supra note 44, at 59–60.
52
551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
53
Id. at 894–95.
54
Judge Posner has called the rule of reason “little more than a euphemism for nonliability.”
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977). Judge Easterbrook has argued that saying a practice is
subject to the rule of reason is, practically, tantamount to saying that it is per se legal. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 305 (1987).
49
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b. Structure and performance in exclusion cases.—Exchanging
per se liability for rule of reason analysis may be the most obvious example
of antitrust’s evolution from rules to standards, but the trend has been
present, if less visible, in monopolization cases too.55 Antitrust courts have
turned away from questions about firm conduct towards “structure and
performance” analysis. Because monopolization looks, to the outside
observer, so much like legitimate competition, courts have always struggled
to separate exclusionary behavior from sharp dealing. Early landmark
Sherman Act cases looked to the conduct and intent of the parties in order
to determine liability.56 Intent may be an evidentiary nightmare, but it has a
per se quality: if you meant to monopolize, then you did. This syllogism
seems to have motivated the decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America57 despite statements in that case that intent is irrelevant.58 This
focus turned out to be problematic for deciding monopolization cases, not
only because intent is so difficult to prove, but also because antitrust
enforcement was most concerned about effects of, not motivation for,
conduct. Judges began to realize the problems of using monopolistic intent
as a proxy for anticompetitive effect.59
As a result, courts began to deemphasize conduct and intent and focus
on the structure of the industry in question and the performance of the
defendant firm.60 These indications of monopolistic behavior may be
circumstantial, but at least they get to the regulatory intent behind the
Sherman Act: to prevent anticompetitive exclusion, not to punish bad
thoughts. Today, courts continue to look for market circumstances that
indicate monopolization rather than looking for bad actors. For example,
courts view certain practices differently depending on the defendant’s
market power.61 Recognizing that context matters was a move away from
rules and towards standards, and it meant that “market power”—by
definition a fact-specific, case-by-case determination—would be important
in (even dispositive of) allegations of exclusion. Today, a plaintiff stating a
Section 2 claim must first prove as a threshold matter that the allegedly
55

See Crane, supra note 44, at 65–71.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75–77 (1911).
57
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
58
Although Judge Hand claimed to “disregard any question of ‘intent,’” later in the same paragraph
he observed that “[i]n order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to monopolize,
and the intent to monopolize.” Id. at 431–32.
59
Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948) (“It is, however, not always necessary to
find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have
been violated.”). For a comprehensive analysis of the role of specific and general intent in antitrust
liability, see Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (2001).
60
See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2008).
61
See, e.g., Gavil, supra note 40, at 852 (“Market power, [defined as the power to control prices or
exclude competition], has become an increasingly necessary ingredient of Section 1, non per se Sherman
Act offenses.”).
56
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monopolizing firm has a dominant market share.62 Likewise, some firm
behaviors are perfectly legal absent market power but illegal when the firm
is dominant.63
Determining market power is an economically sophisticated
endeavor.64 Since Cellophane, courts define a relevant market as all the
products that can serve as reasonable substitutes for one another.65 In
Cellophane, the judge determined this by ordinary common sense and a
little anecdotal evidence,66 but modern market definition necessarily
involves econometrics to be upheld by a reviewing court. For example, the
merger guidelines use a rigid, multistep test, known as the SSNIP test, to
define the relevant market for the purpose of evaluating premerger and
postmerger concentrations.67 The SSNIP test defines a market as all the
products made by the smallest set of firms, which, if merged, could execute
a “small but significant non-transitory increase in price” without losing
enough sales to other firms to make such a price increase unprofitable.68
This measures the cross-elasticity of demand of a product, which essentially
asks the same question asked in Cellophane—whether products are
substitutes—but uses econometrics rather than intuition to answer it.
Despite its recipe-like structure, the SSNIP test requires expert
judgment and nuance to be done properly. First, if a firm constituting the
hypothetical monopolist was already exercising market power, the test may
suggest that products are good substitutes for each other when, under
competitive conditions, they are not. This was likely the case in Cellophane
and so has come to be known as the treacherous “Cellophane Fallacy.” The
SSNIP test does not necessarily avoid this logical error, so as a preliminary
matter an economist must determine whether firms in the industry are
pricing monopolistically already. Second, actually estimating a firm’s
62

See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 225–26 (6th
ed. 2007).
63
For example, tying (subject to Section 1 liability) is only illegal if the firm has market power in
the tied product. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984), abrogated
by Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (“Accordingly, we have condemned tying
arrangements when the seller has some special ability—usually called ‘market power’—to force a
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.”); see also Ill. Tool Works,
547 U.S. at 31; 1 ABA S ECTION OF A NTITRUST LAW , supra note 62, at 552. Even the way in
which market power is defined has shifted from the realm of rules to the sea of standards. In Illinois
Tool Works, the Court overruled their old rule that a patent was by itself sufficient proof of market
power. 547 U.S. at 42–43.
64
See Gavil, supra note 40, at 852–55.
65
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956)
(“Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how different from one another
are the offered commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one commodity for
another.”).
66
Id. at 402–03.
67
See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
68
Id.
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ability to raise its price is an exercise in hypothetical reasoning that must
aggregate many variables and data on consumer reactions to price changes
that can be thin and noisy. Reliably answering these questions requires
sophisticated economic modeling, which, in the words of one frequent
economic expert witness, is as much art as it is science.
2. More Standards Means More Economics.—The “reason” in the
rule of reason is economic; the rule asks courts to sort business practices
into those that promote competition and those that restrict it.69 And market
definition necessarily involves the expertise of an economist, since
boundaries are defined according to a product’s role in the larger
economy.70 What promotes and what restricts competition, and how
consumers respond to different products, are among the central inquiries of
industrial organization. Far from the grist of first-year legal education, these
are technical, (social) scientific questions that cannot be answered by a
judge without help from expert economists.71 The operation of markets is
incredibly complex because of the interrelation of all actors and the
invisibility of prices, information, and incentives influencing behavior.72
Thus, the Supreme Court has defined the very content of a rule with
reference to an area of knowledge beyond the understanding of judges. The

69

In Leegin, the Supreme Court asserted that “[i]n its design and function the [rule of reason]
distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and
restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.” Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). Judge Posner recognized this view of “reason”
in an article reacting to GTE Sylvania: “[T]he Court is implying that antitrust prohibitions must have an
economic rationale and that the aesthetic delights of smallness and the yearning to resurrect a nation of
sturdy Jeffersonian yeomen will not be permitted to decide antitrust cases.” Posner, supra note 54, at 13.
Now, three decades after the “revolution,” there is “near-universal agreement that U.S. antitrust is now
essentially a set of issues in microeconomics.” Lipksy, supra note 4, at 164.
70
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1349 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (“The role of the economist as an expert depends upon the emphasis of the various antitrust
statutes, with the scope of that role widening as the focus shifts away from conduct and towards
structure or performance.” (quoting Michael J. O’Hara, The Economic Expert in the Antitrust Arena,
12 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 17, 19 (1980)); Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis in Antitrust
Litigation Support: The Federal Trade Commission’s 1986 Challenge to the Proposed Merger of CocaCola and Dr. Pepper, in THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMIC ECONOMIST IN LITIGATION SUPPORT,
supra note 24, at 11, 12 (“The rise of the structure-behavior-performance paradigm of microeconomics
for analyzing markets . . . surely contributed to the rising importance of economists in antitrust
litigation support.”).
71
Thomas Hungar and Ryan Koopmans put it starkly: “There is probably no other area of the law in
which the Court so frequently relies on academic scholarship.” Hunger & Koopmans, supra note 6, at
54.
72
In this way, economics is similar to another social science, psychology, whose role in the
courtroom is similarly up for debate. See David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science
Under Daubert: Is it “Scientific,” “Technical,” or “Other” Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 960, 963 (1995).
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rule of reason and cases requiring market definition are, for all practical
purposes, not judge-made but economist-made law.73
By giving power over the application, and sometimes even content, of
antitrust rules to economists, the shift to standards puts judges and juries at
the mercy of expert witnesses.74 Another way of saying this is that the rise
of standards, like the rule of reason, represents a delegation of authority
from judges and juries to economists. This raises several questions: how
should judges treat expert opinions in a particular case? What kind of
control should a judge exercise over the courtroom economist? Under what
conditions may the judge disagree with him and reject his opinion?
B. Deference to Expert Authority in Antitrust
Judicial control over courtroom expertise presents a puzzle, since by
definition an expert has knowledge not accessible to lay decisionmakers.75
Judges and juries need help from expert economists because the economic
considerations relevant to an antitrust trial are beyond their competence as
laypeople.76 Given the complexity of industrial organization economics, it
is unlikely that in the course of a single trial these decisionmakers can learn
enough economics—even with the help of experts—to make a fully
independent judgment about the competitive effect of a business practice or
the relevant definition of a market. At some point, a lay decisionmaker will
have to defer to an expert’s opinion.77 But when does expertise merit
deference?
73

See Stucke, supra note 5, at 1425–28. One symptom of this awkward arrangement is the
difficulty judges have in drawing a line between expert testimony about facts (allowed by the rules of
evidence) and testimony about law (technically prohibited by the rules of evidence) in rule of reason
cases. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 155–56 n.1. Even when an expert
economist establishes “facts” about a market or a behavior’s effect on competition, these facts tend to
look like conclusions of law.
74
Gavil, supra note 40, at 843 (“One characteristic of this ‘new antitrust paradigm,’ however,
appears to be well entrenched: it is dependent upon economics and economists.”); Interview with Judge
Vaughn Walker, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 26, 26 (“It’s impossible, it seems to me, to prosecute or
to defend an antitrust case without significant expert testimony.”).
75
Alvin I. Goldman, Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EXPERTISE 14, 17–18 (Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease eds., 2006) (defining the “novice/expert”
problem).
76
As District Court Judge Kathryn Vratil puts it, “[T]he court and the jury tend to have
psychological barriers to dealing with antitrust issues. Most judges don’t encounter antitrust cases often
enough to acquire a real familiarity and level of comfort . . . . From a jury’s point of view, most of them
will be totally unfamiliar with economic issues.” Interview with Judge Kathryn Vratil, ANTITRUST,
Spring 2003, at 19, 19.
77
This statement epitomizes a “deferential” view of expert authority, which is in tension with the
“educational” view of expert testimony that regards the proper role of experts as explaining their
discipline to factfinders and convincing them of the truth value of their claims. A theoretical defense of
the deferential view is beyond the scope of this Article, but for a more thorough discussion of the terms
of the debate, see Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference
or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1131 (1993). This article merely claims that the Supreme Court’s
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The paradox of lay judgment about expertise was best articulated by
Judge Learned Hand in 1901: “[H]ow can the jury judge between two
statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to
their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the
expert is necessary at all.”78 The answer, according to the Supreme Court, is
to evaluate content-neutral, second-order criteria related to the opinion, and
then, when these are met, to recognize the authority of its content.79 This
subpart first defines “authority” as it applies to expert witnesses and then
argues that the principle rule for admitting expert testimony asks judges to
treat experts as authoritative. Finally, this subpart shows that the Supreme
Court treats economic consensus, not just economic opinion, as
authoritative in antitrust suits.
1. Authority Defined.—Authority is content independent. We say
something has authority when it requires obedience even among those who
disagree with its substance. Statutes have authority not because the actors
they regulate or the judges applying them believe that they are morally
correct or wealth maximizing. Instead, they have force because they were
enacted by the legislature, and the law demands that people obey mandates
enacted by the legislature. Likewise, a judge follows Supreme Court
precedent not because he agrees with the Court’s decision or its reasoning,
but because he is bound to do so since it comes from the Supreme Court.
“The force of an authoritative directive comes not from its content, but from
its source.”80 But even if the substance of an authoritative directive cannot
be questioned, one may question whether a source ought to be considered
an authority at all. In the context of legal reasoning, this inquiry involves
considering the hierarchical position of the issuing court, whether the
directive is still “good law,” and whether it applies to the present facts—
i.e., whether it is “on point.” These questions, at least in theory, are
independent of the content of the directive. A judge cannot say (at least
without being accused of bucking precedent) “this case is not on point
because it puts forth a bad rule.” Content-neutral criteria are “second order”
criteria when they are used to evaluate an expert opinion; in contrast, “first
order” analysis would directly examine the content of the opinion.81
Legal authority that is within a court’s jurisdiction is still good law,
and, if on point, requires a court to follow it because a superior court said
so. But not all authority is binding. A judge may still have content-neutral
reasons for following nonbinding cases, and in this sense he recognizes
antitrust jurisprudence has made clear that at least some deference to expertise is necessary, and even
encouraged, in judicial decisionmaking.
78
Hand, supra note 12, at 54.
79
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1992).
80
Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935 (2008).
81
Cf. Vermeule, supra note 16 (explaining the difference between first-order reasons and secondorder reasons).
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their authority.82 For example, suppose an appellate court is presented with
a legal question that has been answered by other circuits. The court may
reasonably believe that it is unlikely that another circuit (or three or ten),
looking at the same problem, would have gotten it substantively wrong. The
appellate court’s reason for following the consensus is content independent,
even if it is based on a belief that the content is sound, since it does not
involve a first-order analysis of the legal problem. Likewise, a judge may
cite an article in Nature because he believes that scientific conclusions
written by accomplished scientists and published in a peer-reviewed journal
are unlikely to be wrong. Thus, he may reasonably assert that cells use
mitochondria to generate chemical energy even without observing this
phenomenon himself. This is the kind of “persuasive authority” that expert
witnesses have in court. Faith in expert opinion is content neutral, but not
neutral about whether its speaker has qualities that increase his likelihood of
being right.83
2. The Authority of Courtroom Experts.—In the context of economic
testimony, a judge will recognize the authority of an opinion if it—and its
speaker—meet certain second-order criteria set out by Daubert and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.84 A judge performs this content-neutral analysis
in his role as evidentiary “gatekeeper,” assessing the speaker’s “knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education”85 for signs that his opinion is
reliable. Of the opinion itself, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 asks a judge to
evaluate its basis in fact, methodology, and fit with the question being
asked of the expert.86
What constitutes sound methodology has become a complicated and
contentious area of evidence law. Until 1993, expert testimony was
considered reliable, and thus admissible, if “the thing from which the
deduction is made [is] sufficiently established to have gained general

82

Schauer, supra note 80, at 1947–49.
Credentials, for example, can serve as content-neutral criteria that a judge or jury can use to infer
the accuracy of the speaker’s testimony. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and
Intellectual Due Process, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERTISE, supra note 75, at 111, 141.
84
Sheila Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
S49, S50 (2005) (“[Daubert] urg[es] judges to defer to scientific authority . . . .”). Adrian Vermeule
argues that so, too, should nonexpert administrative decisionmakers use only second-order, or contentneutral, criteria in choosing to adopt an expert opinion. See Vermeule, supra note 16, at 2234–35.
Vermeule endorses the second-order criterion of “nose counting”—or crediting propositions held by the
majority of experts asked. Id. at 2234, 2250–51.
85
FED. R. EVID. 702.
86
Id. For a discussion of “fit,” see Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1992) (“[W]e conclude that [the expert’s] conclusions go far beyond the known facts that form the
premise for the conclusion stated. This conclusion so overstates its predicate that we hold that it cannot
legitimately form the basis for a jury verdict.”).
83
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acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”87 This “general
acceptance” standard, laid out in Frye v. United States, was revised by the
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, which called
for a more detailed inquiry into whether the methodology is “scientific.”88
The Daubert test retains Frye’s “general acceptance” criterion, but only as
one of five “general observations” about what makes testimony sufficiently
scientific to be reliable and admissible.89 The opinion suggests four other
signs of scientific reliability: whether the methodology can or has been
tested, whether there are established standards for the methodology,
whether it is has been subjected to peer review, and whether it has a known
error rate.90
The Daubert criteria are, at least theoretically,91 content neutral in the
sense that they focus on “principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.”92 A judge’s task in a Daubert hearing is to
investigate whether an expert’s qualifications and methodology conform to
scientific norms.93 Of course, the line between methodology and

87

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Although Frye was not a Supreme
Court decision, its holding was treated as the authority on expert testimony in all federal cases until
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals overruled it in 1993. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 587, 589.
88
Id. at 589–95. In 2000, the Daubert rule for the admissibility of expert testimony was codified in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Many states have adopted the Daubert standard
to govern the admissibility of expert testimony in state court. Some, however, retain the Frye standard.
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (2005).
89
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
90
Id. at 593–94. The actual impact of Daubert on the admissibility of expert evidence is explored in
Cheng & Yoon, supra note 88, and Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting
Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 251
(2002). Both articles suggest that “general acceptance” still plays a dominant role in admissibility.
Cheng & Yoon, supra note 88, at 478; Dixon & Gill, supra, at 278 (“[G]eneral acceptance has, if
anything, increased in importance since Daubert.”).
91
Practically, methodology and conclusions are difficult, if not impossible, to separate. See
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 158 (“In practice . . . these differences [between
methodology and conclusions] are readily exaggerated.”). The gray area—in which a judge can reject an
expert’s conclusions without appearing to second-guess the expert’s substantive opinion—is created by
Rule 702’s requirement that the methodology “fit” the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702(a); see also
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (discussing the “fit” requirement). For a good example of how methodology
can be conflated with conclusions under a “fit” analysis, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 153–54 (1999).
92
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. As one influential Daubert amicus put it, “[i]t is how the conclusions
are reached, not what the conclusions are, that makes them ‘good science.’” Brief Amici Curiae of
Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. in Support of Respondents at 22, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102),
1993 WL 13006286, at *22.
93
Daubert asks the judge to act “as an external observer comparing the expert’s methodologies
with what appears to be acceptable.” 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 44:9, at 708 (2008). For a discussion
of this task in an antitrust trial, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 158.
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conclusions can be elusive,94 but Daubert at least rhetorically recognizes a
difference. In doing so, it carves out part of the expert’s opinion as offlimits to a second-guessing judge.95
Similarly, juries assess second-order criteria when choosing to credit
an expert’s testimony once it is admitted. At least the jury makes some
indirect judgments about reliability, as we may infer from the common
practice of questioning an expert witness in front of the jury about his
credentials, experience, and education.96 And of course a jury can consider
the demeanors of all witnesses—including experts—in choosing to credit
their testimony.97 How the judge and jury should divide the task of
evaluating an opinion’s reliability is the subject of a raging debate.98 But for
94

See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“But conclusions and methodology are
not entirely distinct from one another.”); Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, The Implications of
Daubert for Economic Evidence in Antitrust Cases, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 801, 815–16 (2000) (“In
many cases, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the methodology from the conclusions
because the conclusions are often dependent on the methodology employed.”).
95
Edward Imwinkelried’s influential “syllogistic” model of expert evidence implicitly recognizes
the authority—the unassailability—of (at least part of) an expert’s testimony. Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1,
9–10 (1988). Imwinkelried persuasively argues that an expert’s testimony properly takes the shape of a
syllogism, where the major premise consists of scientific propositions proven by generations of
scientists and accepted by consensus of the academic community. Id. The minor premise consists of the
facts of the case at hand, and the conclusion results from the expert’s application of the major premise to
the minor premise. Id. Imwinkelried advocates for very different standards of deference for an expert’s
major and minor premises, implicitly recognizing that judicial second-guessing about a major premise
voids the benefit of the expert in the first place. Id.
[T]he witness’ choice of theories and studies to employ as a major premise should be afforded
substantial deference. The scientific witness is an expert precisely because he has intensively
studied the literature in that field. That study may be the witness’ life work. The witness’ sphere of
expertise consists of mastery of the concepts, methodologies, principles, and theories peculiar to
the witness’ scientific discipline. The scientific witness knows “the ways of his work” better than
the judge or jurors. In selecting a major premise, the witness acts in his capacity as a[n] expert.
Because the scientific witness has unique, superior expertise in the field, the witness’ choice of a
major premise warrants great respect.
When we turn to the witness’ selection of information as a minor premise, a radically different
picture emerges. . . . [T]here is a much less compelling case for deference to the witness’ selection.
Id. (citations omitted).
96
These indirect judgments may also be inferred from jury instructions emphasizing that “[i]f you
should decide that the opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education or
experience . . . you may disregard the opinion in part or in its entirety.” Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (2001) (quoting EDWARD J.
DEVITT ET AL., 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.01, at 404 (4th ed. 1992) (civil and
criminal)).
97
The federal pattern instructions admonish the jury to consider all witnesses’ “intelligence, motive
and state of mind, and demeanor and manner while on the stand,” id. at 1128 (quoting 3A DEVITT ET
AL., supra note 96, § 73:01, at 49 (4th ed. 1987) (civil)), and then emphasizes that they “should consider
the testimony of expert witnesses just as you consider other evidence in this case.” Id. at 1130 (quoting
DEVITT ET AL., supra, § 14.01, at 404). Perhaps in some circumstances the layperson can also
evaluate the internal coherence of an expert’s argument. See Brewer, supra note 83, at 136–41.
98
On the one side are those more comfortable with judges making reliability determinations. These
are the commentators who say judges improperly punt it to the jury. See, e.g., Blair & Herndon, supra
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both judge and jury, the heart of the expert opinion—to use Schauer’s
terms, its content, and to use Daubert’s terms, its conclusions—is
unassailable.
3. The Authority of Economic Consensus.—If there were just one
scientifically reasonable truth about an economic question and Daubert’s
second-order criteria worked well to weed out unreliable economics, then
there would be no battle-of-the-experts problem in antitrust trials. Whether
Daubert works well for economics is a question for another day, but even if
it did, the first proposition is obviously false. So the problem of dueling
antitrust experts endures. Scientific opinion, at least about matters complex
enough to be relevant in an antitrust trial, is never perfectly heterogeneous.
What should a judge do when faced with two conflicting, yet unassailable
scientific conclusions?
If the overall distribution of expert opinion on the matter heavily favors
one side, that can be a good indication—itself content neutral—that the
favored side is right. This notion of consensus is, according to modern
philosophy of science, the very essence of scientific proof.99 Put simply,
“[s]cience converges.”100 The truth value of consensus may play a
particularly important role in nonexperimental sciences like economics,
where without what Milton Friedman calls the “essential experiment,” the
“weeding-out of unsuccessful hypotheses [is] slow and difficult. They are
seldom downed for good and are always cropping up again.”101
Unsurprisingly, reviewing courts often cite “academic consensus” as
support for an antitrust judgment or rule.102
For example, in Leegin, the Court justified its decision eliminating the
per se ban on resale price maintenance by citing expert economic consensus
as support for the theoretical proposition that the practice can be used to
promote competition.103 The Court explained that “[t]hough each side of the
debate can find sources to support its position, it suffices to say here that
economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a
manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance.”104 It went on to describe

note 94, at 813–14. On the other side are those who prefer jury decisionmaking about expert
reliability. These are the commentators who say judges improperly usurp the domain of the jury. Cf. In
re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., No. 00 MDL 1368(CLB), 2006 WL 931692 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
7, 2006).
99
See Huber, supra note 14, at 739–42 (describing the role of consensus in science).
100
Id. at 724.
101
MILTON FREIDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 11 (1953).
102
See supra note 6.
103
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007).
104
Id.
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that proposition as “essentially undisputed,”105 representing “widespread
consensus,”106 and having the support of the “bulk of the economic
literature.”107
Tellingly, the thrust of the dissent was that there was not expert
consensus on a related point: whether and to what extent the theoretically
procompetitive uses of RPM actually happen.108 The real-world existence of
a theoretical benefit is an empirical question, but like most empirical
economic questions, it is not likely to be answered through
experimentation. An economist’s best guess will be based on data about the
uses of RPM and its effect on price and quantity from the actual wholesaleto-retail market. The four-Justice dissent attacked the lack of consensus on
this question:
How often . . . will the benefits to which the Court points occur in practice? I
can find no economic consensus on this point. There is a consensus in the
literature that “free riding” takes place. But . . . [t]he question is how often the
“free riding” problem is serious enough significantly to deter dealer
investment.109

Still, both the majority and the dissent thought consensus was important in
evaluating the theoretical and empirical claims of each side’s experts.110
III. THE DUBIOUS AUTHORITY OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS IN
ANTITRUST TRIALS
So the stage is set for a conflict—one that plays out in many areas of
law but especially those, like antitrust, that rely heavily on technical and
specialized knowledge. The Supreme Court asks lower courts to make and
apply antitrust rules by deferring to academic consensus, but gives them a
procedure—adversarial expertise—that systematically conceals consensus.
If the Supreme Court’s delegation of rulemaking authority to courtroom
economists in Daubert worked smoothly, then a judge’s job would simply
be to qualify experts using its content-neutral criteria and then defer to their
opinions. But in qualifying antitrust experts, second-order signs of
reliability fail the antitrust judge. Daubert, whatever its value in weeding
out bad methodology, cannot eliminate legitimate, methodologically sound
105

Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner at 16, Leegin, 551 U.S.
877 (No. 06-480)).
106
Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Leegin, 551
U.S. 877 (No. 06-480)).
107
Id. (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT
DISTRIBUTION 76 (2006)).
108
Id. at 915 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
109
Id.
110
For another example of the Court’s respect for consensus positions when faced with
disagreement, see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15–18 (1997) (rejecting economic justifications for
a per se rule because “criticism of those premises abounds”).
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differences of opinion among experts. And consensus, the second-order
criterion that reviewing courts often find dispositive, is obscured by the
adversarial method of expert evidence. Judges are left with no choice but to
engage the substance of experts’ economic claims—the conclusions
Daubert tried to leave unassailable—in deciding antitrust cases.
This Part outlines the judge’s three possible moves in response to
(apparent) deadlock among qualified economists in an antitrust trial. First,
judges may engage in first-order analysis of economic opinion by distorting
the Daubert standard. For example, judges sometimes require that an
expert’s opinion in that case has been actually verified by the economic
community, rather than requiring her to use a methodology that is, in the
abstract, susceptible to verification. Or judges use Daubert to criticize the
way an expert uses an accepted methodology, which can be tantamount to
questioning her conclusion.
Second, a judge can distort the summary judgment standard to reject a
claim that is supported by an economic argument he finds substantively
wrong. Here, judges are actually spurred on by Supreme Court precedent
condoning, or even perhaps requiring, antitrust courts to engage in
substantive analysis of expert opinion when granting summary judgment.
Judges make similar first-order assessments at other stages of a trial that
call for a summary evaluation of the merits, such as class certification or
considering a temporary injunction pending final resolution of the case.
Finally, a judge can punt the issue to a jury, which is likely to be even
less qualified than a judge to engage in antitrust economics. Juries are
forced to look for other, less relevant criteria, or to decide the case as a
matter of substantive economics. Thus, the jury is asked to mediate an
academic debate that is, by definition, beyond its competence. All three
moves require laypeople to resolve academic disagreements and do
economic science in the first instance, potentially resulting in an almost
arbitrary choice between a majority and minority view on the economic
issue in question.
A. Distortions of Daubert
When faced with the dilemma of two qualified but contradictory expert
opinions, judges often try to avoid arbitrary judgments by resolving the
economic controversy before any evidence gets to a jury.111 But since
111

Richard Katskee argues that judges do this for a legitimate and laudable reason: to preserve the
legitimacy of court decisions. Richard B. Katskee, Science, Intersubjective Validity, and Judicial
Legitimacy, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 857, 862 (2008). Under his argument, pure deference to economists
would place the substantive reasoning behind a legal decision outside the comprehension of the public,
as would “black box” jury decisions. By engaging in economic science in a legal opinion, a judge
makes the determinants of a decision visible. Id. “If courts are to provide what most of us will regard
as a fair trial . . . they must base their rulings on publicly accessible facts, which they must then weigh,
measure, and test using publicly accessible forms of legal reasoning.” Id.
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Daubert is designed to prevent first-order analyses of expert opinions,
judges must bend the standard to do so.112 The first way in which a judge
can distort the Daubert standard is to apply its criteria directly to the facts
being offered by the expert in the case.113 Daubert requires that an expert’s
methodology be scientific, which can be evinced by its being subject to
validation and peer review, having a known error rate, and being accepted
by the “relevant scientific community.”114 But sometimes a court will take
this a step further and require that the actual opinion offered in the present
case be subject to these requirements.115 Data and conclusions prepared for
litigation are unlikely to be published and so in most cases will not have
been subjected to peer review or replicated and verified by other
economists.116
This reformation of Daubert is most clearly illustrated in City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., a case alleging that chlorine
wholesalers in Alabama fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act.117 The
plaintiff’s expert offered “an economic analysis of market structure and
competitive behavior”118 that concluded that “[t]he liquid chlorine industry,
notably the activities of repackagers/distributors fits the[] market conditions
and product characteristics . . . [most conducive to] collusive activities.”119
The district court found his testimony to be inadmissible because “[a]s
subjective beliefs, his interpretive opinions have not and cannot be tested,
have not been subjected to peer publication, cannot have a known or
potential rate of error, do not have general acceptance in economics, and

112

One reason why courts may choose to do substantive economics during a Daubert hearing rather
than as a matter of law at summary judgment is that decisions to exclude or admit testimony are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997). This largely
insulates a district judge’s economic reasoning from reversal, but it also means that courts of appeals
cannot develop “a consistent body of criteria of reliability that should be used for particular types of
recurring expert testimony.” Gavil, supra note 40, at 851.
113
See Gavil, supra note 8, at 677–78.
114
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993).
115
See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).
116
Experts often do transform work done for trials into academic pieces, but this is typically done
after the conclusion of a controversy. Economics professor William Baumol says serving as an expert
witness “has contributed materially to [his] academic output,” and cites that as one of the best reasons
(above remuneration!) for an academic economist to act as a consultant or a witness in litigation.
William J. Baumol, Research, Pure and Impure: Their Economies of Scope, in THE ROLE OF THE
ACADEMIC ECONOMIST IN LITIGATION SUPPORT, supra note 24, at 31, 31. Sheila Jasanoff identifies
a more troubling instance of courtroom experts publishing related articles: “The Nature article on DNA
typing by Eric Lander and Bruce Budowle was interpreted by some as an attempt to create the
appearance of consensus and thus to provide easier entry for DNA testimony in the O.J. Simpson murder
trial.” JASANOFF, supra note 18, at 52.
117
Tuscaloosa, 877 F. Supp. at 1509.
118
Id. at 1513.
119
Id. (quoting expert report of Robert F. Lanzillotti).
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have not been generally accepted.”120 The judge concluded: “Therefore,
they are not reliable under Daubert.”121 By using the strictures of Daubert
but applying them to the expert’s data and opinion, not to his methodology,
the Tuscaloosa court disguised substantive reasons for disagreement as
content neutral.
The second kind of Daubert twist occurs when a judge excludes an
expert’s testimony based not on faulty methodology, but rather on faulty
use of a legitimate methodology. Objecting to the way a methodology is
used can be very similar to objecting to a methodology, close enough that
the Court has endorsed the use of Daubert to conclude that there is “simply
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”122
But often this kind of analysis is actually substantive disagreement dressed
up as a methodological critique. Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp.123
provides a good example. In that case, an expert whose qualifications were
unimpeached claimed to be using a Cournot124 model to show that a
defendant’s market share was evidence of monopolistic behavior.125 He
improperly assumed that two firms engaged in Cournot competition would
share the market 50/50. According to the expert, if the defendant achieved a
market share greater than 50%, then it must have engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.126
It should not surprise even someone without economic training that
this assumption of 50/50 market share in a competitive Cournot duopoly is
overly simplistic.127 But the economist’s methodology—analyzing
oligopolistic markets by using a Cournot model assuming rational, profitmaximizing, quantity-setting oligopolists—was sound.128 The district court
admitted the evidence after a Daubert challenge,129 but the Eighth Circuit
reversed in an opinion that conflated second-order analysis of methodology
with first-order use of that methodology.130 Its opinion reads more like a
discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence rather than its admissibility,

120

Id. at 1526.
Id.
122
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
123
207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
124
Cournot competition describes rivals who compete by setting quantity. Each firm’s chosen
output will maximize its profit when it is its “best response” to its rival’s output, keeping in mind that its
rival will also produce its “best response.” Thus, under the Cournot model, firms’ outputs can be
described as a Nash Equilibrium. Andrew F. Daughety, Cournot Competition, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 301, 301 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
125
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1056.
126
Id.
127
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 179.
128
Solow & Fletcher, supra note 18, at 501.
129
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1057.
130
Id.
121
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impugning the “legally sufficient evidentiary basis,”131 the “probative
value”132 of expert opinion evidence, and the evidence’s ability to “sustain a
jury’s verdict.”133
Similarly, in In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litigation, a district
judge comprehensively deconstructed an expert’s regression analysis of
price data.134 Finding the model lacking because it failed to consider
variables she felt were relevant, she excluded it under Daubert.135 She
attacked his assumptions as “unjustified” and his conclusions as
“scientifically unsound and irrelevant under Daubert.”136 Her in-depth, and
quite competent, evaluation of the expert’s testimony revealed significant
flaws in the model, but required her to adopt the role of a peer reviewer of
an economist’s argument. She stepped outside her limited role as a
gatekeeper and evaluated the substance and conclusions of the expert
testimony. In contrast, a different district court judge facing the same
scenario—experts with dueling regression analyses of price data—admitted
both with only a sentence or two about Daubert.137 In his view,
“[e]conometric and regression analyses are generally considered reliable
disciplines. . . . [R]egression analysis is testable, generally accepted and
reproducible.”138 In both Concord Boat and Aluminum Phosphide, the
district judges assumed the role of economist, and, probably as a matter of
economics, got to the right answer—or at least excluded the wrong answer.
But in both cases the judges had to bend Daubert’s vision of deference to
(qualified) experts’ substantive claims.
B. Matsushita Encourages Judicial Second-Guessing of Economic Experts
at Summary Judgment
Likewise, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for
summary judgment, a strict interpretation of procedural rules would imply
that a judge ought not to engage in first-order economic analysis. On a
motion for summary judgment, expert testimony is theoretically like any
other factual testimony. To the extent that expert opinions raise a “genuine
issue of material fact,” the conflict is resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party.139 In other words, if experts on each side disagree about a material
point, the judge, having qualified the expert under Daubert, must assume
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. (quoting Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 447 n.4, 454 (2000)).
Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 n.19 (1986)).
Id. at 1057.
893 F. Supp. 1497, 1500–05 (D. Kan. 1995).
Id. at 1507.
Id.
Ohio ex rel. Montgomery v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (S.D. Ohio

1996).

138
139

Id.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992).
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the nonmoving party’s expert opinion is methodologically sound, and then
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law. According to a
strict interpretation of the summary judgment standard, to disbelieve an
expert for substantive reasons invades the province of the jury, who is
charged with resolving all issues of credibility.140
But in antitrust cases, the Court has developed a more liberal standard
for granting summary judgment, exemplified in its Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.141 decision in 1986.142 A plaintiff
whose claim “simply makes no economic sense” must “come forward with
more persuasive evidence to support [his] claim than would otherwise be
necessary” to survive summary judgment.143 “Economic sense,” of course,
is not a legal concept, but an economic one developed through expert
testimony. Effectively, Matsushita requires judges to weigh the credibility
of conflicting expert testimony—already ruled admissible at the Daubert
stage—as a prelude to finding the evidence sufficient for summary
judgment.144
Matsushita alleged an implausible conspiracy—decades long and
involving several companies—to sell Japanese televisions in the United
States at predatorily low prices in an effort to drive American
manufacturers out of the market.145 The plaintiffs’ experts presented
evidence that the Court characterized as merely “consistent” with an
inference of exclusion through predatory pricing.146 The Third Circuit ruled
that the district court should not have excluded the expert testimony
because once the expert was qualified, he was entitled to rely on whatever
he wanted (respecting the content neutrality of authority).147 But the
Supreme Court reversed. According to the Court, predatory pricing in the
context of international television sales was implausible as a matter of
economic theory, and so evidence more than just “consistent” with
140

Cf. Gavil, supra note 8, at 699 (distinguishing the kind of credibility evaluation that is within the
province of the judge—that derived from “qualification, relevance, and reliability”—and the kind of
credibility solely within the province of the jury—that related to the “ultimate burden of persuasion”).
141
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
142
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 189.
143
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
144
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 189–90 (“One important but perhaps
unforeseen consequence of Matsushita is that it may require the federal judge to engage the economist
on the latter’s own terms. . . . Matsushita often forces the antitrust judge to get into the expert’s
discipline itself and to reject the expert’s own substantive conclusions in favor of the judge’s own.”).
145
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577–78.
146
Id. at 580–81. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Japanese market producing consumer
electronics was oligopolistic, that they faced “higher fixed costs than their American counterparts,” that
they had capacity in excess of the Japanese demand for their products, that the Japanese manufacturers
fixed minimum export prices by agreement, that they limited their American distributors also by
agreement, and that these minimum export prices were consistently undercut by complicated rebate
schemes. Id.
147
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277–78 (3d Cir. 1983).
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exclusionary intent was required to survive summary judgment.148
Economic theory suggested that the underpricing was more likely the
Japanese competing with the Americans than the implementation of “an
economically senseless conspiracy” to predate their rivals.149 So the
Americans had to show evidence that was not only consistent with illegal
behavior, but “tend[ed] to exclude the possibility” of innocuous behavior.150
A motive on the part of the Japanese, in particular, was lacking, so
summary judgment was required.151
Subsequent lower court opinions confirm that Matsushita created a
kind of exception to the traditional rule that judges may not independently
weigh factual evidence in deciding a motion for summary judgment. In
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., for example, the Ninth Circuit
characterized Matsushita and its progeny as holding that “[i]n the context of
antitrust law, if there are undisputed facts about the structure of the market
that render the inference economically unreasonable, the expert opinion is
insufficient to support a jury verdict.”152 In other words, if a judge believes
that a fully qualified economic expert is being “economically
unreasonable,” his testimony can be disregarded.
Rebel Oil hinged on whether the retail gasoline market included both
self- and full-service products.153 The district court denied the defendants’
motion for summary judgment because experts on both sides disagreed
about the appropriate market boundaries, but the Ninth Circuit reversed
after an “independent review of Rebel’s expert affidavits” that “compel[ed]
the conclusion that it would be unreasonable for a juror to infer from those
affidavits that full-serve sales of gasoline should be excluded from the
relevant market.”154 The expert on the side of the nonmoving party was
simply wrong as a matter of economics,155 and so, as a matter of law, the
evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict.156 Thus, the court
second-guessed the substance of qualified expert testimony, turning
summary judgment into a mini-trial in which a trier of fact weighs the
persuasiveness of competing testimony.157
148

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (“[C]onduct as consistent with permissible competition as with
illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.” (citing
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 754 (1984))).
149
Id. at 597–98.
150
Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
151
Id. at 596–97.
152
51 F.3d 1421, 1435–36 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468–69 (1992)).
153
Id. at 1434–35.
154
Id. at 1436.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 1443.
157
Cf. Elliott, supra note 1, at 499 (“Summary judgment is not a very useful tool for probing
conflicting scientific judgments . . . .”).
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There may be similar pressure to decide economics as a matter of law
at other stages of litigation that require a summary evaluation of the merits.
For example, the First Circuit recently reversed a class certification order
because the trial judge had not adequately developed and evaluated the
economic realities behind the antitrust claim.158 It disapprovingly noted the
lower court’s willingness to delay critical evaluation of the economics of
the case.159 The First Circuit conceded that “[i]t is true that the validity of
plaintiffs’ theory is a common disputed issue. It will be for the fact finder to
decide whether this theory is persuasive.”160 But it demanded from plaintiffs
a stronger economic theory before the class could be certified. “We are
looking here not for hard factual proof, but for a more thorough explanation
of how the pivotal evidence behind plaintiff’s theory can be established.”161
Similar pressure to evaluate a case’s economic merits may exist at the
preliminary injunction stage.162
C. Weyerhaeuser and the Perils of Leaving Economic Judgment to a Jury
The third move courts make in response to obscured economic
consensus in antitrust cases is to ask a jury to decide between two opposing
experts or use the jurors to triangulate a consensus position. For example, in
2003, Judge Panner of the District of Oregon presided over an antitrust trial
against Weyerhaeuser, a sawmill that made finished lumber from alder logs,
which it purchased from local timberland owners and loggers.163 A
competitor, Ross–Simmons, sued Weyerhaeuser, alleging monopolization
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, accusing the company of deliberately
bidding up the price of the input logs in an attempt to drive Ross–Simmons
out of business.164 The economic theory of the plaintiff’s case was that as a
dominant purchaser of alder logs, Weyerhaeuser had market power to affect
the price of logs, which it did in order to put Ross–Simmons out of
business.165
Dr. Richard Zerbe testified as an expert for Ross–Simmons, describing
Weyerhaeuser’s conduct as a kind of buyer-side predation. In his affidavit,
he explained that “raising rivals’ costs through purchases or other
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In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
Id. at 19 (“The court noted it did not yet have enough evidence to determine the merits question
of whether the plaintiff classes actually suffered antitrust or consumer protection injury. It repeatedly
emphasized it would address that question later on a proper record—for example, at summary
judgment.”).
160
Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
161
Id.
162
See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
163
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.
2005).
164
Id. at 1034–35.
165
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross–Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 316 (2007).
159
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restrictions on necessary inputs (known as real foreclosure) is a recognized
method of gaining market power.”166 After Ross–Simmons’s exit,
Weyerhaeuser would enjoy either increased monopsony power as a
purchaser of alder logs or monopoly power as a seller of lumber, or both.167
He argued explicitly that economic harm from overbuying would result
from wasted resources since, as a predatory bidder, Weyerhaeuser
purchased more logs than it could process into lumber.168 He argued
implicitly that consumer harm resulted from the foreclosure of competition
in the downstream market.
Weyerhaeuser rebutted Dr. Zerbe’s testimony with its own economic
expert, Dr. Randall Pozdena. Dr. Pozdena pointed out that the “raising
rivals’ costs” idea had “failed to achieve widespread acceptance by the
economics community.”169 He explained that the theory was imprecise
because it required recognizing when a purchaser buys an input
“significantly in excess” of what is “reasonably needed,” terms that could
not be defined without making a substantive judgment about how a
company ought to be conducting its business of production.170 Taken in the
best light possible, Dr. Pozdena argued, the plaintiffs’ theory of foreclosure
was actually an allegation of predation, and as such required evidence that
Weyerhaeuser had been losing money on their “overbuying” of alder
logs.171 Dr. Pozdena argued that Dr. Zerbe’s testimony was deficient
because it did not show that Weyerhaeuser’s conduct had the hallmark of
predatory behavior: negative profits.172 Thus Dr. Pozdena implied that
buyer-side predation is analytically analogous to seller-side predation, a
view that Dr. Zerbe did not share.
166

Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Statement of Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. at 4, Confederated Tribes of Siletz
Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 3:00-cv-01693-PA, 2003 WL 23715982 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2003),
2003 WL 24868040.
167
Id. at 5 (“Weyerhaeuser executives advocate consolidation in the industry as part of an effort to
gain greater control over product price and in turn profitability.”); Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings
at 56, Confederated Tribes, 2003 WL 23715982, 2003 WL 24267869; see also ANDREW I. GAVIL ET
AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
673–74 (2d ed. 2008).
168
Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Statement of Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., supra note 166, at 4–5
(“Specifically, Weyerhaeuser purchased alder sawlogs in quantities that exceeded not only what would
have purchased [sic] in the absence of predatory behavior, but even in excess of what could be processed
prior to degradation of the sawlogs.”).
169
Expert Report of Dr. Randall J. Pozdena at 26, Confederated Tribes, 2003 WL 23715982, 2002
WL 33782319. He also described “raising rivals’ costs” as “a controversial and little-accepted form of
predatory behavior,” id. at 7 (emphasis omitted), and an “arcane notion.” Third Supplemental
Declaration of Dr. Randall J. Pozdena at 9, Confederated Tribes, 2003 WL 23715982, 2003 WL
24243963.
170
Expert Report of Dr. Randall J. Pozdena, supra note 169, at 26.
171
Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings at 69–71, Confederated Tribes, 2003 WL 23715982, 2003
WL 24243961 (“[T]he best measure of whether you’re hurting yourself or not in this particular industry
is: Are you making money on the logs that you buy?”).
172
Expert Report of Dr. Randall J. Pozdena, supra note 169, at 22.
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Both economists were well qualified and had published in the area of
competitive foreclosure. Dr. Zerbe had a Ph.D. from Duke in economics
and held a dual appointment as a professor at University of Washington’s
School of Law and School of Public Affairs.173 He had published dozens of
articles in antitrust and law and economics, including a seminal piece on
predatory pricing174 that had been cited by the First Circuit in Barry Wright
Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.175 and by over twenty-five law review articles.
Dr. Pozdena also had a Ph.D. in economics and had teaching experience at
UC Berkeley’s and UC Irvine’s business schools. He was the managing
director of a global economic consulting firm and, like Dr. Zerbe, he had
published extensively in the field of antitrust economics.176
Although Judge Panner did not write an opinion about the dueling
expert evidence, he had two opportunities to decide the answer for himself
based on his own best guess about market foreclosure and predatory
conduct: at Daubert hearings and at summary judgment. He chose a third
option and allowed both opinions to go before the jury. The jury returned a
$26 million verdict on Dr. Zerbe’s theory that predatory bidding is
analytically distinct from predatory buying.177 Taking up the idea that
predatory pricing affects consumers differently from predatory buying, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.178
But the Supreme Court reversed, seemingly moved by the idea that the
weight of economic authority sided with Dr. Pozdena.179 Big names in
antitrust economics like William Baumol, Kenneth Elzinga, and George
Hay filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court outlining the dominant
position of industrial organizational economists—that predatory bidding
and predatory pricing are analytically identical.180 They argued that both are
rarely successful, and failed attempts actually benefit consumers in the form
of lower prices of the finished good.181 This argument proved dispositive to
the Supreme Court.182 The jury, it seemed, was not able to discover the
consensus position any more than Judge Panner was.
173

Resume of Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Confederate Tribes, 2003 WL 23715982, 2000 WL 35768885.
Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982).
175
724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983).
176
Expert Report of Dr. Randall J. Pozdena, supra note 169, at 1–2.
177
That calculation was trebled under Clayton Act § 4, hitting Weyerhaeuser with an almost $80
million judgment. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross–Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 317
(2007).
178
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.
2005).
179
Ross–Simmons, 549 U.S. 312, 321–25.
180
Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11–13, Ross–Simmons, 549 U.S.
312, 2006 WL 2459522.
181
Id. at 3–8.
182
Ross–Simmons, 549 U.S. at 323–25.
174
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The problems with jury decisionmaking in technical areas have been
well documented, especially in the antitrust context. Judge Frank
Easterbrook articulated the costs of unreasoned, and thus unpredictable,
jury verdicts: “To set the jury adrift on uncharted seas—and then to defer to
whatever it does—is to introduce considerable risk into all business
decisions.”183 Whether this state of affairs is worse than when a judge treats
his own economic conclusions as dispositive is another matter.184 But in
either scenario, the economic debate—thought to be beyond the ken of lay
people—is resolved by just such a lay decisionmaker. Worst of all, it is
resolved without the benefit of knowing how the experts divide themselves
between the two positions.
IV. SOLUTIONS
If adversarial expertise is the problem, then an obvious solution would
be to make courtroom expertise nonadversarial in antitrust trials. The vast
body of literature on the hired gun problem is filled with proposals for
removing the adversarial aspect of expert testimony. Most of these solutions
are variations on the same theme; they all involve a neutral process for
selecting one or more “disinterested” experts.185 This Part first examines
three versions of this idea for their ability to better reveal the actual
distribution of academic opinion on economic issues relevant to antitrust.
I then move beyond solutions aimed at “disinterested” expertise and
suggest two solutions that, while still allowing parties to select their own
experts, may better reveal whether an opinion reflects a consensus or is a
minority view in a scientific community. First, I suggest that in the process
of admitting an expert’s opinion, the judge should take testimony on how
widely held that opinion is within his academic community. Second, I
borrow a procedure from jury selection, suggesting that each side of an
antitrust suit be allowed a small number of peremptory strikes against his
opponent’s expert witness list. This would effect a significant change in
procedure, but is perhaps justified as an experiment in an area of law where
the battle-of-the-experts problem is especially costly.
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Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 979

(1986).
184

On the one hand, the average juror has less education and certainly less exposure to antitrust
issues than a judge. But on the other hand, a jury benefits from having “many minds” bringing their
reasoning and knowledge to bear on a question, which can, under certain circumstances, raise the
accuracy of decisionmaking. See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 96, at 1134, 1177.
185
See, e.g., Carl Kaysen, An Economist as the Judge’s Law Clerk in Sherman Act Cases,
12 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 43 (1958); Posner, supra note 22; Robertson, supra note 3; Note,
Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941
(1997); Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of Two Models,
32 IND. L. REV. 225 (1998).
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A. Existing Proposals: The Disinterested Expert
1. Court-Appointed Experts.—Under the seldom-used Federal Rule
of Evidence 706,186 a district court judge can appoint an expert to advise
him on technical matters, such as antitrust economics, as well as to testify in
front of a jury.187 If used more widely, judges could use this approach to
appoint experts selected because they occupy mainstream positions in
economics and can express those positions clearly to laypeople.188 It would
also eliminate the problem of a partisan expert feeling like he plays for a
team to which he must be loyal.189 His value to the trial is not dependent on
whether he can give his client good news. Under this system, the court is
his client, whose interest should be in truth and justice rather than the
success of one party.
The word “should” in the last paragraph raises an obvious and perhaps
devastating criticism of court-appointed expert witnesses: judges, like
parties, are biased when it comes to choosing economic experts.190 For the
parties, bias comes most powerfully from wanting to win, but for the judge,
the source of bias is ideological. Economics, because of its tendency to
make contingent claims rather than prove scientific truths, and because of
its redistributive consequences, is political.191 In a world where judges
appoint expert economists, we would expect an antitrust minimalist to
testify at every Republican appointee’s trial and a pro-liability/proregulation witness to testify at every Democratic appointee’s trial. This
might give antitrust trials some predictability, but not the kind we are
looking for.
186

The infrequency of Rule 706’s use has preoccupied evidence scholars. See 1 FAIGMAN, supra
note 93, § 1:38, at 113 (“Although rules of evidence have long provided for court-appointed experts,
judges are reluctant to embrace this option.”); Elliott, supra note 1, at 501–02; Gross, supra note 2, at
1190; Robertson, supra note 3, at 198–201. In Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and
Scientific Evidence, supra note 185, the author cites a 1993 survey revealing that 80% of responding
district judges had never appointed an expert. Id. at 947 n.47.
187
FED. R. EVID. 706. An early incarnation of this idea was put forth by Learned Hand in 1901: “It
is obvious that my path has led to a board of experts or a single expert, not called by either side, who
shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the case which lie within his province.”
Hand, supra note 12, at 56.
188
Cf. Posner, supra note 22, at 1539–40 (discussing common objections to court-appointed
experts).
189
See sources cited supra note 23.
190
See Elliott, supra note 1, at 503 (“If every expert comes to court with an ‘axe to grind,’ then
why add the court’s expert, with his or her own partisan beliefs and commitments, to those of the
parties.”). The problem of the biased court-appointed expert is amplified by the fact that the jury might
give special weight to this seemingly “independent” expert. Wood, supra note 13, at 94; cf. Gross,
supra note 2, at 1193 (“Some couch this argument in strong rhetorical terms: the appointment of an
expert witness by the court compromises the impartiality of the judge (who associates her prestige with a
particular witness) . . . .”).
191
Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 309, at 165–66 (discussing the normativity of
economic science).
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Even a nonbiased judge will have a difficult time determining whether
an expert represents the majority view. What criteria should she use in
determining the status of an expert’s opinion? Most experts who want to be
hired will want to describe themselves as occupying the heartland of
economic thought. So in looking for help, a judge would have to make the
very judgments she needs help for, resulting in a kind of “experimenter’s
regress.”192 Rule 706 also has serious practical limitations. One theory put
forth for why judges so infrequently use Rule 706 is that they do not know
how to go about finding a reliable expert.193 There is no “yellow pages” of
neutral, reliable practitioners of economics.194 And Rule 706 requires both
parties to share the cost of the appointed expert, which has given some
judges pause when the means of the parties are unequal.195
Part of the problem with allowing judge-appointed expert witnesses is
that the process is ad hoc and one-off. Instead, some argue that a region
(perhaps at the federal district level) could have a permanent economic
expert, or even a panel of experts, shared by judges of diverse ideological
outlooks.196 A panel of economic experts has the obvious advantage of
numbers over a single witness; a panel draws a larger sample from expert
practitioners and so is less likely to reflect an outlying view.197 These
experts would develop track records over time that judges, academics and
the public could criticize. Too much fringe economics could cost a staff
economist his job. A semi-permanent position would give the experts an
opportunity to learn the ins and outs of the most common economic puzzles
to come up during antitrust trials.198 He could become not only an expert in
economics but also an expert in antitrust litigation.
192

Experimenter’s regress describes the puzzle of scientific measurement, when “‘facts’ can only
be generated by ‘good’ instruments but ‘good’ instruments can only be recognized as such if they
produce ‘facts.’” Benoît Godin & Yves Gingras, The Experimenters’ Regress: From Skepticism to
Argumentation, 33 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 137, 137–38 (2002).
193
Reisinger, supra note 185, at 238.
194
Justice Stephen Breyer, an advocate for improved scientific decisionmaking by courts, points to
a few new institutions as sources of relief. First, Justice Breyer suggests that collaboration between the
Federal Judicial Center and the National Academy of Sciences, initiated in the late 1990s, will improve
“communication among the science, engineering, and legal communities.” Stephen Breyer, Introduction
to FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 5 (2000). Second, Justice
Breyer praises the collaboration between the American Association for the Advancement of Science and
the Science and Technology Section of the ABA, designed to “aid the courts in finding skilled experts.”
Id. at 7–8.
195
See Interview with Judge Vaughn Walker, supra note 74, at 28 (“The problem that has kept me
from [appointing an expert] most frequently is the inability of one party to share the cost.”). Further,
actually collecting the expert’s fee from the party whose side the expert disfavors could be difficult.
See Wood, supra note 13, at 94.
196
See Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 490 (1986).
197
See Elliott, supra note 1, at 504 (“The panel [would be] intended to give the jury a picture of
the range and distribution of scientific opinion.”); see also Carl Kaysen, supra note 185, at 46–47.
198
Vermeule discusses this phenomenon in expert panels used in agency decisionmaking: “[P]anels
whose members serve for long periods may develop ‘endogenous expertise’ through experience and
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Again, this strength is also a weakness. The longer an economist works
for a court, the more she becomes a part of the legal world. Eventually she
risks losing her status as an active member of her academic community and
becoming a pseudo-lawyer. Part of the value of an expert witness is her
status as an outsider—both because it assures her expertise in her field but
also because the more an expert becomes savvy about the law, the more we
worry her role as an advisor is legal or political, not just technical.199
Another drawback of this suggestion is that it shifts the cost of
economic expertise from the parties to the court. This has two potentially
pernicious effects. First, and most simply, it makes the judiciary pay for
something it used to get for free, putting a burden on its budget and,
eventually, the taxpayer. But perhaps the larger problem is the other side of
the coin. Under the current regime, parties have to assess how important
expert economic testimony is to their case, and invest accordingly.200 With
court-appointed panels of experts, they get something for free that they used
to pay for.201 This might result in parties overusing staff economists since
they no longer internalize the cost of doing so.202
2. Two Experts Agree on a Third.—In addressing the problem of
dueling experts, several commentators have suggested that we borrow “a
leaf from a common method of selecting arbitrators: Each party chooses an
arbitrator and the two arbitrators choose a neutral, who generally casts the
deciding vote.”203 Using this model, Judge Posner suggests that experts

institutional learning over time. In such cases, the panel’s initial findings and predictions may be flawed,
but their quality will systematically improve over time.” Vermeule, supra note 16, at 2267 (footnote
omitted).
199
For large-scale litigation, the problem of entrenchment may be solved by appointing ad hoc
panels of experts to make findings of fact that would only serve for one trial. For example, while
presiding over a multidistrict product liability action against breast implant manufacturers, District
Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. achieved homogeneity of expert opinion over many jurisdictions when he
appointed a national expert panel to investigate the causal link between implants and injury. See Lars
Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation,
49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1047 (2000); Reisinger, supra note 185, at 227.
200
Vermeule, supra note 16, at 2252 (“[R]ational parties will invest in hiring additional experts up
to the point at which the marginal increase in the expected payoff equals the marginal cost of hiring the
next expert.”); cf. Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Evidence Production in Adversarial vs.
Inquisitorial Regimes, 70 ECON. LETTERS 267, 268 (2001) (presenting a model that recognizes that
“[e]vidence is costly to produce, so the decision of how much evidence to produce is an optimal
stopping problem for each of the litigants”).
201
The parties could be required to pay to use the staff experts, and that fee could go towards the
experts’ salaries and benefits. But their parties’ willingness to pay would be low since they are rolling
the dice about whether the expert or panel will see things their way.
202
Note, however, that under the current regime there may already be significant overuse of
experts. When dueling experts’ informational inputs cancel each other out, the battle resembles an
arms’ race and the result is overinvestment in a socially wasteful competition.
203
Posner, supra note 22, at 1539; see also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1096 (1985).
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from each side of a trial together agree on a third expert who would be
appointed by the court to testify either alongside or instead of the parties’
experts.204 The purpose of this is to solve the appearance of deadlock
between two qualified experts when really one expert represents the
mainstream belief and the other the fringe.
What kind of economic testimony would result from Posner’s
technique? There are several possibilities. First, we might think that the two
economists will agree on some middle ground—a kind of average of their
perspectives. If we imagine a spectrum from hawk to dove, the third
economist might be somewhere around blue jay. If there is considerable
consensus in the economic community, the middle ground is likely to
reflect it. If the two-appoint-third system results in an averaging, it might
work to get at consensus.
But we might think that the two parties will not be willing to agree to
an average of their beliefs. Instead, the two economists may only agree on
an unobjectionable third expert. For this, we might imagine not a spectrum
of economic beliefs, but a Venn diagram of overlapping beliefs. A hawk
believes propositions A through S, and a dove believes propositions H
through Z. They would agree on an economist that believes H through S,
since neither party could object to any of his beliefs. This strategic model
might not help solve the problem of eliminating the fringe belief. Suppose
the fringe belief is proposition A, held by the hawk in this hypothetical, and
not contained within the set of propositions believed by the dove or the
“unobjectionable” economist. If a case turns on whether A is true, the hawk
side has no reason to agree to any expert who does not believe A. The
parties would reach an impasse, and the court would need to find another
mechanism to select an expert. Thus, the value of this solution depends on
empirical questions: how are opinions distributed among experts, and will
parties be able to agree?205
3. “Blind Expertise.”—Professor Christopher Tarver Robertson has
offered a fresh take on neutral experts in his article Blind Expertise, in
which he proposes a double-blind procedure for parties to solicit expert
opinion on a case.206 In the article, Robertson identifies expert bias,
inevitable in a regime where experts are paid by and have extensive contact

204

This is similar to the German system as described by John Langbein. See Langbein, supra note
23, at 837 (“[T]he code requires the court to use any expert upon whom the parties agree . . . .”).
205
Rigorously answering these questions would be a daunting task. There are many economic
propositions that are both controversial and essential to antitrust policy, and mapping a picture of
academic opinion on them would require intense research. But the Cochrane Reviews, which
taxonomize scholarly opinion about health and disease, overcame similar challenges. See Cochrane
Reviews, THE COCHRANE COLLABORATION, http://www.cochrane.org/cochrane-reviews (last visited
Aug. 1, 2012).
206
Robertson, supra note 3.
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with their side, as the biggest problem in adversarial expertise.207 To protect
experts from the influence of the parties and to prevent parties from cherrypicking favorable experts, Robertson proposes a third-party intermediary
that would receive fact patterns from a litigation party and pass them along
to a qualified expert for his opinion.208 The party would not know which
expert was being asked, nor would the expert know which side was doing
the asking.209 The expert would be paid no matter what his opinion turned
out to be.
Robertson’s “blind expertise” attacks the seemingly intractable
problem of hired guns, and he argues that it does so without significant
changes to the current structure of litigation or rules of evidence.210 Just
adding the blind procedure as an option, without even making it mandatory,
might result in its extensive use. Because opinions obtained through the
intermediary according to the double-blind procedure would be highly
credible due to reduced bias, blind expertise would be more valuable than
partisan expertise. Thus the parties would find themselves in a prisoner’s
dilemma: whether they think their opponent will try for a blind expert or
not, their best move is to try for one themselves.211
Although Robertson emphasizes bias as the source of disagreement
between experts, his innovation can address the battle-of-the-expert
problem even if the source of heterogeneity among expert opinion is not
bias or bad faith but is instead reasonable scientific disagreement. Blind
expertise addresses one dimension of the “bad sample” of expert opinion
discussed in Part I. If the intermediary can impartially select an expert from
a group of experts that reflects the distribution of opinion on a scientific
matter, the sample will be representative. The sample will still be small, but
Robertson makes a strong point that since we can expect both sides to
voluntarily use the procedure, the only way blind expertise can result in a
wrong outcome—in my terminology, a nonconsensus outcome—is if both
randomly chosen experts hold the same outlying view.212 Indeed this seems
unlikely.
The trouble with Robertson’s idea, like many solutions to the hired gun
problem, is logistical. Blind expertise requires an intermediary that is
scientifically savvy, unbiased, and, given the volume of work we could
207

Id. at 184–88.
Id. at 206–09.
209
Id. at 207–08.
210
Id. at 213 (“The blind procedure is designed to work within existing institutions and procedures,
requiring no major changes to substantive or procedural law.”).
211
Id. at 230–41. Subsequent empirical work by Professor Robertson confirms the intuition that
juries give more weight to “blind expertise,” making it more valuable to the side it favors. See
Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, Effect of Blinded Experts on Mock Jurors’ Assessments
of Credibility and Verdicts in Civil Trials, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming Dec. 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884765.
212
Robertson, supra note 3, at 215–16.
208
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expect to pass through it, very large. Robertson makes a plausible
suggestion for the intermediary: the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS).213 As a nonprofit organization, it would
not have a financial motive to influence the outcome of cases. In this sense,
it would be at least as “neutral” as court-appointed experts, and probably
more so. And the association has access to high-level and broad scientific
knowledge,214 so it probably is competent to compile pools of experts on
recurring issues, and to select others ad hoc.
But Robertson understates how much work the intermediary will have
to perform. He accurately notes that if part of the benefit of blind expertise
is that the expert does not know who is soliciting his opinion, then the
intermediary will have to present the question and the data in a way that
suppresses this identity. This would likely involve substantial work on the
part of the intermediary, requiring him to actually engage with the science
of the case. For that, the intermediary would himself need to be an expert,
and would have to be paid accordingly. Additionally, the blind expert’s
opinion could be very costly since it must be “explicit, concrete, and
complete” to be helpful.215 But according to Robertson’s model it, will be
wasted (that is, unused in litigation) about half the time.
Even if Roberston’s idea is costlier than he acknowledges, it may be
worth considering in the context of antitrust trials. The benefits of his
system are numerous and difficult to quantify, and so could offset even such
a complicated system as “blind expertise,” especially in antitrust where the
science is complicated and the financial stakes high. Promoting heartland
economic views in antitrust trials would allow businesses to be more
confident in making decisions ex ante that they will not be sued and subject
to triple damages. And Robertson identifies hidden benefits beyond mere
informational efficiency, suggesting that blind expertise might even
eliminate the need for costly Daubert challenges. If blind expertise is worth
trying at all, it is probably worth trying first in the antitrust context.
B. New Directions: Tinkering with Adversarial Expertise
Existing solutions, however, may not be enough to address the
intractable (and ancient!) problem of the battle of the experts. The very fact
that they exist, and some of them have for a long time, but are rarely used
and have not solved the problem in a meaningful and lasting way suggests
that fresh thinking is called for. Antitrust is an excellent place to start
experimenting with new solutions because of its heavy dependence on
academic consensus for predictable and reasonable results. Starting with

213

Id. at 206.
See AAAS: ADVANCING SCIENCE, SERVING SOCIETY, http://www.aaas.org (last visited Aug. 1,
2012) (describing AAAS’s goals and competencies).
215
Robertson, supra note 3, at 209.
214
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just one area of law, like antitrust, also makes sense because it can act as a
kind of laboratory where success can be replicated or failure quarantined.
To that end, this subpart suggests two new solutions to the problem of
hidden consensus in antitrust litigation.
1.

Taking
Testimony
on
the
Distribution
of
Expert
Opinion.—Perhaps the simplest and least invasive solution to the
problem of obscured consensus would be to admit evidence about the true
distribution of expert opinion. Revealing this distribution would require a
meta-expert, or someone knowledgeable about the state of expertise in an
area of antitrust economics. Most experts are themselves also meta-experts:
one of the qualifications of being an expert is having a good understanding
of the existing literature and the state of consensus in your field. Relatedly,
a good expert should know where his own opinion lies in the larger context
of academic arguments. So a judge could simply require, or at least
encourage, experts to testify not only about their opinions, but also about
their opinions’ statuses in the academy. After all, Daubert may have added
new criteria of reliability to the old Frye standard of general acceptance in
the scientific community, but it did not eliminate that criterion as a
touchstone of admissibility.216
The trouble with relying on a more emphatic use of Daubert’s general
acceptance criterion is that reliable evidence of scientific consensus is
difficult to gather, and if done within the adversarial process, likely to be
subject to the same biases that influence all expert opinions. Objective
measures of consensus are elusive, so self-interested testimony from an
expert is as unpersuasive as it is unrebuttable. A party advocating the
consensus view will be careful to emphasize, during direct testimony, that
its view is shared by a significant majority of the experts. But a jury will
properly discount an expert’s claims of being in the majority, since they
will know that an expert will want to appear that way.
Scientific consensus is defined within the relevant scientific
community in a complicated and insular process.217 An objective measure
of academic consensus would have to go beyond merely asking whether the
idea had been published in a peer-reviewed journal since journals publish
works that are groundbreaking, not pieces that recreate the heartland of a
discipline that passes for truth.218 Frequent repetition or verification of an
216

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
See Jasanoff, supra note 2, at 347.
218
Another objection to using peer review as a proxy for scientific consensus is that peer review
serves a very different purpose in the academy:
Over the long haul, science may approach a gradual maturation of consensus, by virtue of what
may be the nearest thing we have to a genuine marketplace of ideas, but the scientific
community’s various peer review techniques amount to little more than barriers to entry. They do
not purport to anoint particular results as finally settling contested questions.
Noah, supra note 199, at 1046 (footnote omitted).
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idea in different reputable journals might indicate that it represents a
scientific consensus. But that inquiry is more complicated than merely
tallying citations. Temporal considerations are relevant; perhaps more
recent citations are “worth” more than old ones, but at the same time an
older idea is more likely to be a consensus view.219 The medical community
actually performs such meta-analyses of scientific consensus on particular
issues and publishes the results for practitioners to use in the form of the
Cochrane Reviews.220 Presently, nothing of the same scale and rigor exists
for economics. Perhaps economists could undertake a systematic metaanalysis of major economic issues in order to highlight consensus—and
capture its informational benefits for trials—where it exists.
Even armed with knowledge about consensus, bringing it out in a trial
setting will be difficult since a cross-examining attorney faces significant
challenges in using it to discredit an outlying expert. Courtroom-ready
experts, even in the minority, will be practiced at convincing a jury that the
issue is far from settled, and a lay attorney lacks the familiarity with the
relevant academic literature to convincingly engage an expert in his own
game. This asymmetry of knowledge makes cross-examination of expert
witnesses notoriously treacherous.221 In the case of expert witnesses, an
inexpert lawyer can never be sure what the answer to a particular question
will be, and so control is virtually impossible.222 Some commentators have
gone so far as to say that “the best cross-examination of an expert is
none.”223 This problem, however, is not insurmountable and may be
outdated. Attorneys should not shy away from diving into the substance of
their case and developing a familiarity and comfort with the economic
subject matter. As antitrust has become more economically savvy, so has
the antitrust bar.
2. Peremptory Strikes of Experts.—A new suggestion comes from
another process of selection that occurs in the courtroom: the selection of
jurors. Outlying opinions threaten truthfinding enterprises, especially where
a decision must be made unanimously.224 Perhaps this was the legitimate
theory behind what is now the most illegitimate feature of the American
jury system: the peremptory strike. In selecting a jury, the parties have two
219

Shwed & Bearman, supra note 26, at 818.
The Cochrane Reviews feature over 6000 systematic reviews of health preventions and
interventions. See Cochrane Reviews, supra note 205.
221
Shelley Storer, The Weight Versus Admissibility Dilemma: Daubert’s Applicability to a Method
or Procedure in a Particular Case, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 248 (1998).
222
Gross, supra note 2, at 1172–75.
223
ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS § 3.29, at 155 (2d ed. 1973).
224
Cf. Michael S. Kang, Voting as Veto, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1267 (2010) (“Because criminal
law generally requires a unanimous verdict for guilt, the government should be more concerned with
avoiding a juror who is clearly biased against its respective case than trying to include a juror who is
biased towards it.”).
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opportunities to eliminate potential jurors from the panel. First they can
strike an unlimited number of jurors for “cause.”225 These strikes are aimed
at jurors whose outlying beliefs come from bias or an unwillingness to
conform to the proper role of the juror.226 Then, parties are entitled to a
second round of strikes from the jury, during which they can eliminate a
small number of jurors for no reason at all.227
Most scholars agree that peremptory strikes are nothing but an
opportunity for semi-sanctioned discrimination,228 but perhaps the failure of
peremptory strikes lies in their execution, not in the underlying principle. In
theory, peremptory strikes allow each side to eliminate outlying
perspectives that are held in good faith; perspectives that do not result from
juror bias or incompetence. Difference of opinion is, after all, inevitable and
acceptable in doing what juries do: making social judgments and factual
inferences. But the law wants to harness the epistemic value of a group of
peers agreeing on a judgment. Perhaps it was once imagined that
peremptorily striking jurors would allow the band of social opinion to be
narrowed so that consensus would be possible and a jury could speak in
harmony.
The peremptory strike failed at this aim, and it failed spectacularly,
because in the context of jury selection, peremptory strikes cannot reliably
and neutrally eliminate outlying social beliefs and values. The problem is
that the kind of information about jurors that comes out during the limited
and artificial process of voir dire is not the kind of information that should
stand in for social values. At the end of questioning, lawyers know a juror’s
gender, his approximate age, his self-reported views on perhaps a few social
issues, and, most problematically, his race. When these stand in for ideas
about social norms and community values, prejudice is inevitable.229
The anatomy of this failure suggests that the peremptory strike can be
resuscitated in a context where we can more accurately, and without
discrimination, call someone an outlier. In the expert witness context,
lawyers can learn about the relevant views of witnesses without reverting to
stereotypes or prejudice, so we might import the sickly peremptory
225

2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 382, at
594 (4th ed. 2009).
226
See Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory
Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 519 (1992).
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Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge,
85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 157–58 (2005).
228
See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994); Page, supra note 227.
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See Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury that Is Both Impartial and
Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 707 (1998)
(“Faced with making exclusionary decisions on the basis of limited information, attorneys naturally rely
on group stereotypes . . . .”); Page, supra note 227, at 158 (“At best, a peremptory challenge is an
educated guess, whereas at worst it is merely the expression of naked prejudice.”).
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challenge into an environment where it can be healthier by allowing each
side of an antitrust dispute to exercise a small number of strikes against
their opponents’ experts.230 A fringe expert position is, by definition, one
held by a small minority of qualified experts. In the small community that is
industrial organization economics, this may be only a handful. If each party
to an antitrust suit were given the right to peremptorily strike three or four
experts from their opponents’ witness list, it might effectively confine
testimony to only mainstream propositions.231
Procedure for peremptory expert strikes would have to be carefully
tailored to prevent inefficient gamesmanship. For example, the opportunity
to strike should come after the experts have had some opportunity to state
their views so that the parties can work with full information about how
“fringe” the expert opinion is. But a party will want to impose the
maximum costs on his opponent by requiring them to pay several (at least
one more than the maximum strikes allowed) experts to prepare testimony.
In many cases, merely the name of an expert will tell the opposition that his
beliefs are outlying. But not all minority-view economists are well known,
and in any case merely requiring a name will encourage a party to seek out
lesser-known experts.
Some kind of expert report is necessary, therefore, but a full workup of
the economics relevant to the case would be very expensive and
tremendously wasteful. Instead, strikes should occur after an expert
prepares a preliminary examination of the evidence, but before the expert
invests substantial time in preparing a trial-ready report. This will, of
course, result in wasted effort and money, but perhaps this prospect of
waste will chasten parties into preparing only experts that their opponents
will not object to. Under the shadow of peremptory strikes,232 parties might
230

Something akin to this is already permitted, although frowned upon. One party can eliminate his
opponent’s potential experts by hiring them himself, and thus conflicting them out. This practice, known
as “parking” experts, is wasteful because it necessarily involves one side hiring more experts than it
needs, but it may prove worthwhile in some circumstances. For a discussion of “parking” experts, see
Gross, supra note 2, at 1130.
231
This process would capture the “centrist bias” Michael Kang associates with veto voting, or
voting according to negative preferences. In this way, it could bias decisionmaking towards the
consensus view. See Kang, supra note 224, at 1260–62. For his discussion of peremptory strikes of
jurors as negative voting, see id. at 1267–71.
232
Game-theoretical analysis suggests that the process of proposing and striking each expert should
happen sequentially, rather than as a simultaneous game. If the procedure were set up to be
simultaneous, each party would present N + 1 experts, where N is the maximum number of allowed
strikes. Then each side would strike the maximum, leaving the least extreme expert standing. This would
require finding, briefing, and hearing testimony from all N + 1 experts on each side, or 2(N + 1).
However, if the process for striking experts was designed to be a repeat, sequential game, with each side
presenting one expert at a time, the process would only rarely require all 2(N + 1) experts to appear. For
example, suppose a plaintiff presents expert A for consideration. The defendant will strike A only if it
believes that A is one of the N experts in the field who are most damaging to its defense. In other words,
it will only choose to use one if its precious N strikes against one of the N worst offenders. Knowing
this, and assuming that firing, preparing, and presenting an expert is costly, the plaintiff will not call A in
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themselves avoid fringe positions—or, even more fundamentally, suits and
defenses that rely on them.233
Just like in the jury context, there would still be a “for cause”
elimination round in the form of a Daubert hearing, but it would have to
come after the peremptory challenges because a proper Daubert
investigation into methodology requires a longer workup than just a
preliminary report. But another advantage of the peremptory expert strike
system is that Daubert hearings might be more straightforward and focus
only on second-order factors influencing reliability. With the field of
experts narrowed closer to the consensus, judges may be less often
confronted with the manufactured dissensus problem, and so may not feel
the need to torture Daubert. Of course it is still possible that the opposing
experts will disagree. But if confronted with expert disagreement in the new
regime, a judge may be more justified in thinking that disagreement in his
courtroom accurately reflects disagreement in the academy.
CONCLUSION
The most effective solution to distorted economic opinion in antitrust
trials will depend on an empirical question: what is the shape of
disagreement among experts? Scientific consensus can come in different
forms. It may look like a core cluster of opinion that has no meaningful
disagreement, surrounded by a few outliers in the form of holdouts or
mavericks. If this is the shape of consensus on an economic proposition,
then the peremptory strike idea might work well to eliminate the outliers.
But expert opinion can look more like a normal distribution, with the high
center of the bell curve representing the consensus view. If this is the case,
then peremptory strikes would eliminate only the most extreme tail-ends of
the distribution, leaving parties to call experts from still-very-divergent and
the first place unless he believes his opinions are not so extreme as to get him struck by the defendant.
The plaintiff’s dominant strategy, therefore, is to name the expert who is marginally less extreme than
the N most extreme in the field—or the same expert that results from the simultaneous game—but
without the cost of actual peremptory strikes. Only when the sides disagree about where A is on the
spectrum of opinion must they actually engage in strikes and incur the cost of wasted work. Thank you
to Professor Edward Cheng for helping me work out the game theoretical consequences of sequential
versus simultaneous strikes.
233
Some of the benefits of peremptory strikes can be gained by merely requiring parties to
disclose to the trier of fact the names and reports of all the experts they approached in preparation for
litigation. See Weinstein, supra note 196, at 484. See also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105
F.R.D. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Stephen Easton makes the full-throated case for this solution in
Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun, noting that this would show the judge
or jury just how difficult it was to find expert support for the economic proposition they are
advancing at trial. Easton, supra note 11, at 527–55. The appeal of this solution lies in its simplicity: it
does not require additional trial procedures, court infrastructure, or party expense—it is merely a
disclosure. It would address the problem of selection bias that comes from having the opportunity to
select and reject potential samples from a pool. If a party has to fish for an expert on its side, that
should indicate that their position does not represent the consensus.
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nonconsensus positions on the curve. In the case of a normal distribution of
expert opinion, procedures that average the opinions, such as Judge
Posner’s tripartite panel, might be preferable.
The Supreme Court has made economic consensus the principle driver
of antitrust policy and case outcomes, but has given lower courts an
evidentiary procedure that systematically masks it. Moreover, the Court’s
delegation to academic consensus assumes that such a consensus exists
among industrial organization economists, but without an objective measure
of economic consensus, there is no way to verify that assumption.234 The
procedure for antitrust expertise needs to be reimagined to shine light on the
consensus views of industrial organization economists. The predictability,
legitimacy, and accuracy of antitrust law depend on it.

234

Even a truly “neutral” expert will only provide reliable testimony when there is substantial
consensus in his area of expertise. See Mnookin, supra note 12, at 1021.
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